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Abstract
On the Origin of Shame: Feelings of Disgust toward the Self
John A. Terrizzi Jr.
Shame and disgust are believed to be evolved psychological solutions to different adaptive
challenges and, thus, independent emotions. Shame is thought to promote the maintenance of
social hierarchies (Gilbert, 1997; Fessler, 2004), whereas disgust is believed to encourage
disease avoidance (Curtis et al., 2004; Oaten et al., 2009). Although shame and disgust are often
treated as orthogonal emotions, they share some important commonalities. Both shame and
disgust involve bodily concerns, have been described as moral emotions, and encourage
avoidance of social interaction. The purpose of the current studies was to investigate the relation
between shame and disgust. More specifically, the current research examined whether shame is
experienced, at least in part, as disgust toward the self. As shame is often confounded with guilt
(Tangney et al., 2007), it was important to demonstrate the uniqueness of the relation between
shame and disgust. Thus, guilt was included as a comparison variable. In Study 1, disgust
sensitivity and fear of contamination were positively correlated with shame, but not guilt, even
after controlling for guilt and negative affect. In Study 2, a disgust induction increased shame,
but not guilt, for individuals who were sensitive to disgust. In Study 3, a disgust induction led to
an unanticipated significant reduction in shame, whereas a purity induction did not affect shame.
In Study 4, inducing disgust increased shame for those who were less sensitive to disgust, but not
for those who were more sensitive to disgust. The current research provides initial evidence that
there is a unique relation between shame and disgust. Across all 4 Studies, disgust sensitivity
and shame propensity were positively correlated even after controlling for negative affect and
guilt propensity. However, the results of the three experimental studies provide conflicting
evidence as to the causal nature of this relation.
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SHAME AND DISGUST
On the Origin of Shame: Feelings of Disgust toward the Self
Traditionally, shame and disgust have been treated as orthogonal emotions. Whereas
disgust has been described as a basic or primary cross-cultural emotion (Ekman et al., 1987),
shame has been discussed as a secondary self-conscious emotion (Tangney et al., 2007).
However, shame and disgust share several important similarities. Both shame and disgust
involve bodily concern, have been described as moral emotions, and encourage avoidance of
social interaction. The current work took a novel approach to understanding the emergence of
the self-conscious emotion of shame. More specifically, the current work operated under a
theoretical framework in which self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame) emerge when primary
emotions (e.g., disgust) are reflected on the self. In other words, shame may be experienced as
disgust with the self.
Indeed, the parallels between shame and disgust can be found in classic literary
symbolism. In Samuel Taylor Coelridge’s (1798/1992) epic poem, The Rime of the Ancient
Mariner, the protagonist, the mariner, commits a moral transgression in which he shoots an
albatross. The albatross was considered by seamen to be a symbol of good fortune and its
murder was believed to unleash a curse. As a result of his crime, the mariner was shamed by
having to wear the dead albatross around his neck as a symbol of his moral indiscretion. Shame
is similarly symbolized in Nathanial Hawthorne’s (1850/1956) The Scarlet Letter in which the
main character is required to wear a scarlet “A” as penance for committing adultery. Both of
these literary examples of shame illustrate the bodily nature of shame in that the moral
transgressions were linked to the self (i.e., wearing the carcass of the albatross and the scarlet
“A”). They also illustrate the utility of shame to discourage individuals from engaging in
undesirable behaviors (i.e., shooting an albatross and adultery).
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Relatedly, the emotion of disgust has been linked to the emotional consequences of moral
transgressions. Within many religious traditions (e.g., Christianity), moral violations are
characterized as a stain or defilement as if the body has been contaminated (Ricoeur, 1967). In
order to cleanse the body from sin, many religions incorporate physical (e.g., baptism) and
symbolic (e.g., confession) purity rituals that are meant to cleanse the “soul” of moral
contamination. References to moral purity appear throughout the Bible. For example, one
passage reads, “Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin” (Psalms
51:2). Moreover, one of the New Testament’s most infamous characters, Pilate, in an attempt to
evade any moral responsibility for the execution of Jesus “took some water and washed his
hands before the crowd, saying ‘I am innocent of this man’s blood’” (Matthew 27:24). Similar
symbols of moral cleanliness can be seen in other classic works. In Shakespeare’s (1623/1926)
Macbeth, Lady Macbeth furiously washes her hands to remove the moral stain of plotting a
murder. Together, these literary examples illustrate how the commission of moral transgressions
can lead to disgust with the self.
From an evolutionary perspective, human emotions have been treated as independent
mechanisms that have evolved to solve different adaptive challenges (Darwin, 1872; Nesse &
Ellsworth, 2009). Shame is thought to have evolved to facilitate social order and hierarchy
(Fessler, 2004; Gilbert, 1997), whereas disgust is believed to be an evolved disease-avoidance
mechanism (Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 2009). However, emotions are not always easily
disentangled from one another. As the literary examples above suggest, the historical symbolism
of shame seems to overlap with contamination concerns. Moral transgressors are marked by
their immoral acts. They are stigmatized either by society (i.e., shaming tactics) or by the
commission of the moral violations themselves (i.e., the stain of sin), as if they were a source of
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contamination with which others should not interact or risk contamination. The current research
examined the relation between shame and disgust to determine whether the association between
the two emotions is the result of overlapping evolved psychological mechanisms. Rather than a
merely symbolic relationship, the relation between shame and disgust may provide an example
of how self-conscious emotions can emerge when primary emotions are reflected on the self.
Specifically, shame was proposed to be the emotional consequence of perceiving the self as a
source of contamination. That is, shame may be, at least in part, disgust with the self.
Shame
Shame is considered broadly as a self-conscious emotion, or an emotion that involves
self-reflection and evaluation (Tangney, 2003). That is, the experience of shame encourages
self-evaluative ruminations that are degrading and pervade all aspects of the self (i.e., both
physical and psychological). As such, the self is perceived as innately flawed. Thus, shame is a
negatively valenced self-conscious emotion that results in global self-condemnation (Niedenthal,
Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Tangney, 1991).
Shame can be triggered by both moral transgressions (e.g., cheating) and social norm
violations (e.g., failing to meet others' expectations; Ferguson, Steggie, & Damhuis, 1991;
Keltner & Buswell, 1996). For example, Ferguson and colleagues (1991) demonstrated that
imagining scenarios in which one was either responsible for damaging somebody’s property (i.e.,
moral transgression) or passed gas in public (i.e., norm violation) both elicited shame. Public
exposure (i.e., the presence of others) also increases the likelihood of experiencing shame
(Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002). That is, if others witness the social norm violation,
there is a greater likelihood that the transgressor will experience shame. As such, shame appears
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to serve an important social function as an internal regulatory system, which discourages moral
or social norm violations.
It is important to note that although shame shares many similarities with its sibling moral
emotion, guilt, they are considered distinct emotions. Both shame and guilt are negative
emotions that involve self-conscious evaluation and lead to the inhibition of immoral behavior
(Haidt, 2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Shame and guilt are also very highly
correlated (i.e., people who are prone to shame are also prone to guilt and vice versa) and are
often used interchangeably among laypersons. However, empirical evidence suggests that they
are, indeed, different emotional experiences that lead to very different psychological and
behavioral outcomes (Tangney, 1991). One important characteristic that distinguishes shame
from guilt is the object that is the focus of self-conscious scrutiny (Lewis, 1971). In the case of
shame, the self or one's physical body is the attitude object, whereas with guilt, the attitude
object is an action or behavior. In response to a moral transgression, a person who is
experiencing shame would be likely to think “I am a bad person” whereas someone who is
experiencing guilt would be likely to think “I did a bad thing” (Niedenthal et al., 1994). In other
words, shame can be described as intense negative feelings directed toward the self (Ausubel,
1955).
Compared to guilt, shame is considered to be the “ugly” moral emotion because unlike
guilt, shame is characterized by global self-condemnation and self-oriented personal distress
(Niedenthal, et al., 1994; Tangney, 1991). As a result, shame is considered to be the most
painful of the self-conscious emotions. In fact, some theorists have argued that the pain
associated with shame can be so intense that those who suffer from chronic shame may perceive
suicide as the only means of escape (Hastings, Northam, & Tangney, 2000; Mokros, 1995).
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Moreover, a recent meta-analysis suggests that shame is more predictive of depressive
symptoms, as assessed by the Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression scale (Radloff,
1977) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), than is guilt (Kim,
Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011). The self-hatred and intense self-criticism that characterize
shame not only promote anxiety, depression, and suicidal ideation, but may also play a role in
self-harm and self-injurious behavior (Brown et al., 2009; Gilbert et al., 2010).
Although shame is thought to be primarily evoked by moral transgressions, the selfhatred that is associated with shame may not be confined to the metaphysical self -- the mind. It
may also be linked to the corporeal, bodily self. Gilbert (1997) expanded on the bodily nature of
shame by suggesting that shame is an emergent consequence of the innate human desire to be
perceived as attractive. According to Gilbert, attractiveness is one factor that determines relative
social standing, and shame is an emotional response to the loss of attractiveness and the
accompanying loss of social interaction. In support of this link, evidence suggests that shame
plays a key role in disorders that involve body image. Parker (2003) suggested that shame plays
a crucial role in the manifestations and maintenance of body dysmorphic disorder (BDD).
Parker argued that individuals who suffer from BDD are driven by chronic shame to obsessively
attend to physical features that they perceive as unflattering (e.g., a crooked nose). The resulting
body obsessions can become so intense that the perceived physical flaw turns into an integral
component of the individual’s self-image such that they become preoccupied with rituals such as
looking in the mirror and in extreme cases, body mutilation. Parker further suggested that the
shame which accompanies BDD ultimately encourages the secrecy, hiding, and isolation that is
associated with body image disorders. Similarly, it has been suggested that shame plays a key
role in the onset and maintenance of eating disorders (Goss & Allan, 2009).
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The role that shame plays in perceptions of physical attractiveness and body image may
have important implications for social behavior. Ample evidence indicates that physical
attractiveness is predictive of initial likeability and trustworthiness, which affect the formation of
both same sex and opposite sex relationships (Friedman, Riggio, & Casella, 1988; Pratz, 1983).
Given the influence of physical attractiveness on social status and the formation of new
relationships, the bodily self-criticism, and in extreme cases self-hatred, that can accompany
shame may impede social interaction and the human need to belong (Gilbert, 1997). That is,
shame may function as a deterrent of social norm violations by encouraging social ostracism.
Belongingness, or the desire for human companionship, is an important human need that
motivates behavior (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In fact, the need to belong is so intense that
even simple manipulations, such as a video game (i.e., cyberball) in which players are excluded
from a virtual ball tossing game, can elicit psychological distress (Williams, 2001; Williams &
Jarvis, 2006). Recent evidence has even demonstrated that the pain of social rejection may have
the same neurological roots as physical pain (see Eisenberger, 2012, for a summary). Social
rejection may serve a crucial function in the experience of shame. Some researchers have
described shame as a felt emotion in which a perceived flaw is thought to elicit social
condemnation and potential social rejection (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012; Lewis,
1972). Indeed, research has shown that individuals who have a stigma or perceived stigma are
more likely to approach social interactions with more trepidation and anxiety (Blascovich,
Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998). Thus, the
perceived stigma and bodily obsessions that accompany shame may perform a very specific
social function. According to Fessler (2004), the function of shame is to regulate social systems
and hierarchies. In fact, he speculates that shame is responsible for the aversive effects of social
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rejection and may ultimately be responsible for encouraging the maintenance of social norms. In
support of the relation between shame and social rejection, some research has suggested that
recollection of childhood social rejection (e.g., ignoring by parents) is associated with chronic
shame in adulthood (Claesson & Sohlberg, 2002).
Shame has also been described as “maladaptive” because unlike guilt, which promotes
prosocial behavioral responses to moral transgressions (e.g., apologizing), shame encourages
dysfunctional behaviors (e.g., hiding and avoidance; Ulrich, Berking, & Burkardt, 2006). For
example, one study found that when participants recalled situations in which they felt either
ashamed or guilty, they rated avoidant responses (e.g., I wanted to hide) higher for their shame
recollections and approach responses (e.g., I wanted to apologize) higher for their guilt
recollections (Schmader & Lickel, 2006). Of course, in excessive levels, both shame and guilt
can be considered maladaptive in that they promote negative perfectionism (e.g., fear of failure;
Fedewa, Burns, & Gomez, 2005). However, shame has been largely thought of as the more
maladaptive self-conscious emotion because it encourages behavioral avoidance (Niedenthal et
al., 1994; Tangney, 1991; Ulrich et al., 2006).
Contrary to the negative stigma that shame has garnered, some theorists maintain that
shame performs an important adaptive function. Gilbert (1997) and Fessler (2004) have both
suggested that shame plays an integral role in preserving social order (e.g., maintaining social
hierarchies). Similarly, others have suggested that shame may perform an important adaptive
function in terms of the maintenance of social norms and moral behavior (Tangney & Stuewig,
2004). Indeed, recent research has shed a different light on the perceivably maladaptive
behaviors associated with shame (e.g., avoidance and hiding). The intensive emotional feedback
provided by shame may serve as a deterrent for future transgressions (Grasmick, Bursik, &
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Kinsey, 1991). Additionally, shame can act as a commitment device. Across four studies, de
Hooge, Breugelmans, and Zeelenberg (2008) found that endogenous shame (i.e., shame
experienced in the presence of a social exchange partner) predicted prosocial behavior (e.g.,
giving of coins in a 10-coin give some-dilemma). In a related study, they found that shame
encouraged approach behavior intended to repair a damaged self-image (de Hooge, Zeelenberg,
& Breugelmans, 2010). However, when shame was controlled, social rejection/condemnation
led to less adaptive responses such as defensiveness (e.g., anger; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, &
Brown, 2012). Accordingly, shame may operate as a mechanism that encourages the individual
to proverbially cleanse the self in order to look like a more desirable social interaction partner.
Viewed in this light, avoidance and hiding are behaviors that enable individuals to escape
situations that could lead to further damage to the self and allow the individual to make requisite
repairs before re-entering a social situation. In the rare cases that shame encourages prosocial
behavior (e.g., giving), it is motivated by the need to self-repair and self-protect (de Hooge et al.,
2008; de Hooge et al., 2010). In further support of the adaptive value of shame (i.e., encouraging
adherence to moral/social norms), some evidence suggests that one of the deficiencies in
psychopathy is a lack of shame (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001). Additionally, Tangney and
colleagues (2003) reported that incarcerated individuals exhibit less shame than control subjects
(e.g., non-offenders). Together, these results indicate that shame plays a crucial role in the
preservation of societal norms and may even be crucial for rehabilitation (Tangney & Stuewig,
2004).
In summation, shame appears to be a self-evaluative emotion that has evolved to maintain
social order (Fessler, 2004; Gilbert, 1998) by encouraging individuals to follow proscribed social
norms. If an individual violates a social norm, the moral violation is marked by self-hatred and
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condemnation (Niendthal et al., 1994). Hence, the moral violator is symbolically marked by
negative self-evaluations or the perceived negative evaluations by others, thus, making shame the
“ugly” emotion (Tangney, 1991). The symbolic marking and self-condemnation that accompany
shame serve the purpose of indicating to the self and others that the individual is not fit for social
interaction and, thus, may encourage the shamed individual to engage in hiding and selfreparatory behaviors (de Hooge et al., 2008; de Hooge et al., 2010) in an attempt to make oneself
fit for social interaction.
Disgust
Like shame, disgust is a negative moral emotion that involves bodily concerns and has
important implications for social behavior. Darwin (1872) originally referred to disgust as
“something revolting, primarily in relation to the sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividly
imagined” (p. 254). More recently, disgust has been defined as a cross-cultural emotion (Ekman,
1970) that evolved to protect individuals from bodily contamination including the ingestion of
contaminated food and parasitic infestation (Curtis & Biran, 2001; Oaten et al., 2009). More
specifically, disgust has been described as a disease-avoidance mechanism and a component of
the behavioral immune system (Oaten et al., 2009; Schaller, 2006).
The behavioral immune system (BIS) is a constellation of psychological mechanisms that
have evolved to promote disease avoidance (Schaller, 2006). Whereas the function of the
biological immune system is to defend the body against pathogens once they have entered the
body, the role of the BIS is to encourage the avoidance of situations that could lead to
contamination. The BIS promotes prophylactic responses by automatically inducing adaptive
affective (e.g., disgust), cognitive (e.g., thoughts of contamination), and behavioral (e.g.,
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avoidance) reactions when individuals are exposed to potentially contaminated stimuli (Schaller,
2006).
Disgust is perhaps the most studied BIS mechanism. It can be conceptualized in terms of
a mechanism that can be activated (i.e., turned on or off) by a range of sensory information
indicative of contamination. This includes gustatory (e.g., sour milk), olfactory (e.g., garbage),
auditory (e.g., clearing throat), visual (e.g., vomit), and tactile (e.g., sticky substance) sensory
data. For example, Oum, Lieberman, and Aylward (2011) found that participants perceived wet
stimuli to be more disgusting than dry stimuli, suggesting that tactile cues can be indicative of
perceived contamination.
Although disgust is thought to be an evolved disease-avoidance mechanism that most
individuals experience on at least some level, there is significant variation in disgust reactivity
across individuals. Thus, like most psychological constructs, disgust sensitivity can also be
assessed as a chronic personality trait. Individuals who are sensitive to disgust are preoccupied
with thoughts of contamination. They are prone to Type I errors (i.e., perceiving something as a
disease threat when it is not) and are hypersensitive to disgusting stimuli. Accordingly, the cost
of disgust sensitivity or reactivity is that potentially viable resources will be neglected due to fear
of contamination, whereas the benefit will be reduced exposure to disease threats. Some
measures that have been used to tap into individual differences in disgust reactivity and
contamination concerns include disgust sensitivity (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji et
al., 2007; Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009), fear of contamination (Burns, Keortge,
Formea, & Sternberger, 1996), and germ aversion (Duncan, Schaller, & Park, 2009) measures.
Some of the individual difference variability in disgust sensitivity can be explained by
demographic variables, such as sex and socioeconomic status (SES). Druschel and Sherman
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(1999) demonstrated that there are significant sex differences in disgust sensitivity, such that
females are more sensitive to disgust than males. The sex difference is particularly strong in
regard to sexual disgust (i.e., disgust toward sexual behavior; Tybur et al., 2009). As sexual
disgust varies across the menstrual cycle (Fessler & Navarrete, 2003), the differences in sexual
disgust may have biological roots. Other evidence suggests that SES is also a significant
predictor of individual differences variability in disgust sensitivity. Individuals who are lower in
SES are more sensitive to purity violations (e.g., disgust and contamination) than those who are
higher in SES (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009).
Though disgust has been characterized as an “adaptive” psychological mechanism in that
it promotes disease avoidance, it is important to keep in mind that the trait can be dysfunctional
in both high and low extremes. As is the case with chronic shame, some research suggests that
chronic disgust is predictive of a wide range of psychological disorders. Research has linked
disgust to neuroticism, which is characterized by anxiety and moodiness (Olatunji, et al., 2008).
Moreover, disgust sensitivity is a significant predictor of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD),
as well as spider, blood, and injection phobias (Berle et al., 2012; Tolin, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Lee,
1997). Disgust has also been linked to social anxiety. Amir and colleagues (2010) found that
socially anxious individuals rated disgusted faces more negatively than angry faces.
Furthermore, they found that exposure to disgusting faces led to increased activation of the
anterior cingulate cortex, the same area of the brain that is associated with the pain of social
rejection (Amir et al., 2005).
On the other hand, lacking sensitivity or reactivity to disgusting stimuli can be equally
maladaptive. Although those who are less sensitive to disgust may be less likely to miss out on
valuable resources, they may be more likely to be exposed to potentially deadly contagions.
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Additionally, just as disgust sensitivity is positively correlated with psychological disorders (e.g.,
OCD, phobias and social anxiety; Amir et al., 2005; Amir et al., 2010; Berle et al., 2012; Tolin et
al., 1997), it is negatively correlated with other psychological dysfunctions. Preliminary research
has indicated that disgust is negatively associated with psychopathy (Tybur et al., 2009), which
may help explain the social norm violations that often accompany psychopathy. As such, disgust
has been linked to morality in several studies.
Disgust has been described as a moral emotion concerning purity related social norms
(e.g., taboo; Haidt, 2003). Inducing disgust by exposing participants to varying amounts of fart
spray (e.g., none, 4 sprays, or 8 sprays) resulted in increased severity of moral judgments (e.g.,
reactions to eating a dead family dog; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Conversely,
priming cleanliness (i.e., deactivating disgust and contamination concerns) resulted in less severe
moral judgments (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). Furthermore, preliminary evidence also
indicates that disgust sensitivity is negatively correlated with psychopathy (Tybur et al., 2009),
which may explain why psychopaths are prone to moral and social norm violations. In other
words, psychopaths may lack the internal moral regulatory system of which disgust is a
component and are, therefore, not internally compelled to adhere to societal norms. It is
important to note that the interpersonal nature of moral disgust is functionally different than that
of interpersonal contempt. Whereas disgust is concerned with the moral appraisal of
intentionally malicious acts, contempt is more predictive of moral violations that result from
incompetence (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).
Disgust is often associated with avoiding potentially contaminated food products or waste
material. However, there are other sources of contamination. One of the primary vehicles for
disease transmission is other human beings. Although pathogens presumably do not function on
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the same cognitive plane as humans, like other living organisms, their ultimate evolutionary goal
is to survive and reproduce (Dawkins, 1976/1989). Pathogens achieve these goals of survival
and reproduction by hijacking the bodies of other organisms, commandeering their resources,
and using them as a means of transmission (e.g., via sneezing and coughing; Nesse & Williams,
1994). As a result of the infectious nature of pathogens and their ability to use humans as
vehicles for transportation, other human beings are a significant source of contamination. In
Diamond’s (1997) Guns, Germs, and Steel, he suggests that germs more so than guns and steel
enabled the European colonizers to conquer new lands. Indeed, historical evidence suggests that
upwards of 95% of the Native American population were killed via exposure to smallpox and
other infectious diseases when Europeans colonized the Americas (Dobyns, 1983).
Given that others are a significant disease vector, it follows that people who pose a
significant disease threat should evoke disgust or contamination concerns. Cross-cultural
research on disgust elicitors has provided some initial support for this. For example, evidence
suggests that many of the cross-cultural elicitors of disgust (e.g., vomit, urine, feces, pus, and
blood) share two key features (Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Curtis & Biran, 2001). First, they
are all sources of contamination, and second, they are byproducts of the body. Furthermore,
recent evidence indicates that exposure to people who pose a disease threat (e.g., runny nose)
versus a physical threat (e.g., carrying a gun) activate the biological immune system (Schaller,
Miller, Gervais, Yager, & Chen, 2010). Not only can social interactions activate the biological
immune system, but the biological immune system can also evoke disgust and contamination
concerns. Miller and Maner (2011) found that individuals who had recently been sick were more
avoidant of potentially contaminated others (e.g., individuals with disfigurements).
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Moreover, Schaller and Duncan (2007) have argued that the BIS (e.g., disgust and
contamination concerns) should encourage individuals to prefer ingroup members over outgroup
members because outgroup members pose a greater disease threat (i.e., they may harbor
pathogens for which ingroup members have no immunity). Indeed, evidence has begun to
accumulate suggesting that individual differences in disgust sensitivity and contamination
concerns, as well as inducing disgust and disease threat, are predictive of avoidance of and
negativity toward outgroup members. Faulkner and colleagues (2004) found that trait-level
contamination concerns (e.g., perceived infectability) and inducing contamination concerns (e.g.,
exposing participants to a disease threat) increased negativity toward foreigners (i.e.,
immigrants). Similarly, Navarrete and Fessler (2006) found individual differences in disgust
sensitivity were positively correlated with attitudes toward ingroup members (e.g., Americans)
and negatively correlated with outgroup members (e.g., foreigners). Subsequently, individual
differences and activation of disgust and contamination concerns have been linked to avoidance
of and prejudice toward a wide range of outgroup members including individuals who are obese,
disabled, or sexual minorities (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009; Olatunji, 2008; Park,
Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003; Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2006; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010).
Disgust and fear of contamination may have more wide sweeping implications for social
interactions than merely promoting outgroup avoidance and negativity. In his book, The
Anatomy of Disgust, Miller (1997) describes disgust as “one of our more aggressive culturecreating passions” (p. xii). That is, disgust may play a significant role in the construction of
social norms, rank, and hierarchies. Indeed, disease avoidance has played an important role in
the emergence of culture. For example, some evidence indicates that historical rates of disease
prevalence are predictive of social conformity (e.g., right handedness) and collectivism (Fincher,
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Thornhill, Murray, & Schaller, 2008; Murray, Trudeau, & Schaller, 2011). Furthermore, the
relation is partially mediated by genetic variation, suggesting that the genes that encourage
disease avoidance also encourage social conservatism (e.g., adherence to social norms and
collectivism; Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010).
It has also been suggested that disgust and contamination fears may encourage avoidance
of potentially contaminated outgroup members by encouraging the formation of socially
conservative value systems that promote adherence to social norms and tradition as well as
negativity toward and avoidance of outgroup members (Terrizzi et al., 2010; Terrizzi, Shook, &
McDaniel, 2013). Supporting evidence indicates that disgust sensitivity, germ aversion, and fear
of contamination are predictive of a wide range of socially conservative value systems (e.g.,
right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, religious conservatism, collectivism,
and political conservatism; Terrizzi et al., 2013). Additionally, social conservatism (e.g.,
religious conservatism) mediates the relation between disgust sensitivity and prejudice toward
outgroup members (e.g., sexual minorities; Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2012). Together, this
evidence suggests that disgust plays an important role in shaping social interactions (e.g.,
prejudice and avoidance) and constructing social value systems (e.g., social conservatism) that
are supportive of those interactions. In other words, disgust prepares individuals to perceive
others, who may be a source of contamination, negatively and to avoid them.
Like shame, disgust appears to play an important role in social interactions. Both shame
and disgust promote avoidance of others but for very different purposes (Oaten et al., 2009;
Ulrich et al., 2006). For shame, social avoidance serves to protect the self from the damaging
effects of social norm violations (Tangney et al., 2007), whereas for disgust, social avoidance
enables disease avoidance (Faulkner et al., 2004; Navarrete & Fesler, 2006). Indeed,
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considerable evidence suggests that disgust shapes social interactions via the formation of
negative attitudes toward other people. However, disgust may not only influence an individual’s
attitude toward others, it may also have important implications for attitudes toward the self. It
may be, for example, that perceiving the self as a source of contamination (i.e., feeling disgusted
with the self) results in the experience of shame.
Shame and Disgust
Some theorists have argued that shame and disgust are linked in that they both involve
bodily or self-condemnation, whereas guilt and anger are emotions that involve condemnation of
action or behavior (Nussbaum, 2004; Roseman, 1984). Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa (2011) tested
whether exposing participants to the social cues of either disgust or anger would result in
increased experience of shame and guilt, respectively. Indeed, their study revealed that across
two cultures (i.e., the United Kingdom and Spain), participants who were exposed to pictures
depicting the facial expression of disgust experienced more shame than guilt, and participants
who saw angry faces experienced more guilt than shame.
Another potential link between shame and disgust is the body language and posture that
are associated with the two emotions. Darwin (1872) described shame as turning the body away
in an attempt to avoid. Similarly, he described the mechanics of disgust as pushing away in an
attempt to guard the self. In an empirical examination of emotions and their accompanied
posture, Wallbott (1998) found that both shame and disgust involve a collapse of the upper body
and downward movement of the head. Both of these behaviors are indicative of making the
body a smaller target as if to avoid harm. In the case of shame, the postural change may be an
attempt to avoid the stigma that accompanies moral transgression, a symbolic attempt to keep the
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self free of contamination. With disgust, this behavior serves the more practical function of
protecting the self from bodily contamination.
In addition to evoking similar bodily postures, both shame and disgust promote a similar
broad behavioral pattern (i.e., avoidance). For example, shame has been found to encourage
avoidance of social interaction following moral transgression (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Ulrich
et al., 2006). A similar pattern of behavioral avoidance is observed when individuals are primed
with disgust or a disease threat (Faulkner et al., 2004; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006). Consistent
with the postural similarities of shame and disgust, both emotions seem to promote social
avoidance, which is consistent with disease avoidance. Further emphasizing the unique
relationship between shame and disgust, guilt does not share the same pattern of behavioral
avoidance. Instead, guilt is characterized by approach behavior (e.g., apologizing; Schmader &
Lickel, 2006; Ulrich et al., 2006). Furthermore, in the rare cases that shame does promote
prosocial approach behavior, the goal of the behavior is not to repair a social relationship but
rather it is directed toward repairing the self-image (de Hooge et al., 2008; de Hooge et al., 2010)
as if to symbolically cleanse the self.
Shame and disgust seem to also provide similar functions in terms of the maintenance of
social norms. For example, both shame and disgust have been defined as moral emotions, which
encourage adherence to social norms and moral behavior (Haidt, 2003; Tangney et al., 2007). In
support of the role that shame and disgust play in the maintenance of social norms, both have
been shown to encourage moral decision making (Schnall et al., 2008; Tangney et al., 2007).
Furthermore, deficiencies in both shame and disgust have been associated with psychopathy,
which is characterized by an anti-social disregard for social norms (Morrison & Gilbert, 2001;
Tangney et al., 2003; Tybur et al., 2009).
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A final characteristic that both shame and disgust share is concern with the body or the
self. The bodily concern that is associated with shame is evinced by its association with body
image disorders (e.g., BDD and eating disorders; Gilbert, 1997; Goss & Allan, 2009; Parker,
2003). Disgust too is concerned with the maintenance of the body in that its primary function is
to protect the bodily self from contamination (Oaten et al., 2009). Although shame and guilt are
highly confounded, only shame shares a bodily concern with disgust.
One possible explanation for the apparent relation between disgust and shame is that they
are overlapping psychological systems. Evolution is a haphazard yet efficient process that takes
advantage of existent architecture (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998;
Marcus, 2008). For example, the feather is thought to be an exaptation, a feature that originally
evolved to solve one adaptive challenge but was later co-opted to solve another (Buss et al.,
1998). The feather provides an important structural function enabling avian flight, but it is
thought to have originally evolved as a means of temperature regulation. Much like the feather
now serves a different purpose than the one for which it originally evolved, disgust too may
serve a different purpose. That is, in addition to encouraging disease avoidance, disgust may
play an important role in the maintenance of social interactions by evoking shame.
Accordingly, shame may be, at least in part, an emergent property of perceiving the self
as a source of contamination and disgust. That is, shame may be experienced as disgust with the
self. From this perspective, disgust may serve as an internal moral and social regulatory system
in that once a social transgression has been perpetrated, the self is perceived as a source of
contamination. The stigmatization that accompanies self-disgust and contamination then serves
as an internal contingency that can either motivate hiding and avoidance in order to avoid further
contamination or prosocial behavior as a means of symbolically cleansing the self. In other
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words, shame may be an emergent property of experiencing disgust with the self, which serves
as an internal deterrent of social transgressions.
Current Research
The goal of the proposed studies was to investigate the role that disgust plays in the selfevaluative emotion of shame. Shame and disgust are thought to have evolved to solve different
adaptive challenges (i.e., establishing social hierarchies and disease avoidance, respectively;
Curtis et al., 2004; Fessler, 2004; Gilbert, 1997; Oaten et al., 2009). However, the two emotions
may be more closely related than previously thought. Both shame and disgust have been
described as moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Schnall et al., 2008; Tangney & Stuewig, 2004), have
similar postural (e.g., shrinking, collapsing, turning away; Darwin, 1872; Wallbott, 1998) and
behavioral responses (e.g., avoidance; Oaten et al., 2009 Tangney, 1991), and involve bodily
concern (Gilbert, 1997; Goss & Allan, 2009; Parker, 2003; Oaten et al., 2009). Together, these
results suggest that disgust and shame may be overlapping systems.
Little research has investigated the relation between disgust and shame. Consequently,
the goal of the current series of studies was to investigate the relation between shame and
disgust. Although shame and guilt are often highly confounded (Tangney, 1994), the features
that characterize disgust and shame (e.g., bodily concern and social avoidance) do not describe
guilt. Therefore, the proposed association between disgust and self-evaluation should
specifically result in shame, not general negative self-conscious emotions or guilt. In order to
ensure that the relation is indeed unique to the emotions of disgust and shame, guilt and negative
affect were included as comparison and control variables.
If shame and disgust share some evolved psychological architecture in which the
experience of shame emerges from perceiving the self as a source of contamination and disgust,
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disgust sensitivity and contamination concerns should predict shame proneness. Additionally, if
the effect is specific to shame, disgust and contamination concerns should not be correlated with
guilt and should remain significant even after controlling for negative affect. Furthermore, if
shame is experienced as disgust with the self, there should be a causal relation between the two
systems such that inducing disgust should result in increased shame, but not guilt. Likewise, the
alleviation of disgust and contamination concerns should result in a reduction of shame, but not
guilt. Thus, it was hypothesized that:
H1: Individual differences in disgust sensitivity and contamination concerns would be
positively correlated with shame, but not guilt, propensity.
H2: Subliminally priming disgust (i.e., subconscious exposure to disgust eliciting words)
would increase shame, but not guilt, propensity.
H3: Subliminally priming purity (i.e., subconscious exposure to purity related words)
would decrease shame, but not guilt, propensity.
H4: Supraliminal exposure to an oral contaminant (i.e., barf flavored jelly bean) would
increase shame, but not guilt, propensity.
Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate whether individual differences in disgust
sensitivity and contamination fears are associated with individual differences in shame
propensity and sensitivity. If shame involves disgust with the self, disgust sensitivity and fear of
contamination should be positively correlated with shame. Furthermore, the relation between
disgust and shame should not be a mere product of negative affect. In other words, the relation
should persist even after controlling for negative mood. Additionally, the relation should be
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specific to shame (i.e., disgust sensitivity and contamination concerns should not be correlated
with guilt).
Method
Participants
The participants were 195 introductory to psychology students from Virginia
Commonwealth University (71% female), who participated in the study online via Sona-systems
and received course credit for their participation. They ranged in age from 18 to 47 years-of-age
(M = 20.21, SD = 3.33). Fifty-one percent of the sample was White, 18% were AfricanAmerican, 14% were Asian, 4% were Hispanic, and the remaining 13% were ‘Other’ or
undisclosed.
Measures and Procedure
The participants completed a series of questionnaires online via Sona-systems. The
questionnaires included measures of disgust sensitivity and contamination fears, shame and guilt
proneness, mood, and finally some demographic questions (see Appendix A for all measures).
Disgust and Contamination Measures. General disgust sensitivity was assessed using
the Disgust Scale (DS; Haidt et al., 1994; α = .81). The DS is a 32-item scale. The first 16 items
of the disgust scale are scored on a 5 point scale ranging from 0, strongly disagree, to 5, strongly
agree (originally assessed as true/false). The remaining 16 items are scored on a 5 point scale
ranging from 0, not disgusting at all, to 5, extremely disgusting (originally assessed on a 3 point
scale). DS scores were computed by taking the average of the 32 items. An example item from
the scale is “I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some circumstances.”
Pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust sensitivities were measured using the Three Domain
Disgust Scale (TDDS; Tybur et al., 2009). The scale contains 21 items measured on a 7 point
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scale ranging from 0, not at all disgusting, to 6, extremely disgusting. Scores for each of the
subscales were calculated by taking the arithmetic average of the items belonging to each of the
subscales. Example items include “stepping on dog poop” (pathogen, α = .83), “hearing two
strangers have sex” (sexual, α = .86), and “shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience store”
(moral, α = .89).
The Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised was used to assess disgust
reactivity (van Overveld et al., 2006; α = .89). The DPSS-R is a 16-item scale which contains
two 8-item subscales, one for disgust propensity ( = .78) and one for disgust sensitivity ( =
.79). The propensity subscale assesses how easily an individual’s disgust reaction is triggered
whereas the sensitivity subscale measures the emotional intensity of the reaction. The responses
range from 1, never, to 5, always. Scores for the Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity subscales
were calculated by computing the item averages for the subscales. Example items include “I
screw up my face in disgust” (Propensity) and “Disgusting things make my stomach turn”
(Sensitivity).
Fear of contamination was assessed using the contamination obsessions and washing
compulsions subscale of the Padua Inventory (PI-COWC; Burns et al. 1996; α = .85). The PICOWC is a 10-item (e.g., “I find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things.”) subscale.
Participants indicate the extent to which they experience each statement on a scale from 0 (not at
all) to 4 (very much). The PI-COWC score was calculated by taking the arithmetic average of
the items.
Shame and Guilt Measures. The Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney &
Dearing, 2002) was used to measure shame and guilt proneness (α = .77 & .78, respectively).
Participants read 15 scenarios and rated the extent to which they would respond in a shameful or
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guilty manner. As with the previous measures, item averages were created for the guilt and
shame subscales of the TOSCA. An example scenario includes “At work, you wait until the last
minute to plan a project and it turns out badly.”
The Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP; Cohen et al., 2011; α = .79) is a 20-item
scale, and responses to the items range from 1, very unlikely, to 7, very likely. The GASP
contains two 5-item subscales of shame and two 5-item subscales of guilt. The shame subscales
include a measure of Negative-Self-Evaluation, which assesses global self-condemnation (i.e.,
negative attitudes toward the self), and a measure of Withdrawal, which assesses an individual’s
desire to avoid contact with other people following a moral or social contract violation. The
guilt subscales include a measure of Negative-Behavior-Evaluation, which assesses behavior
condemnation (i.e., negative attitudes toward moral or social contract violations), and a measure
of Repair, which assesses the likelihood of prosocial behavior following a moral or social
contract violation (e.g., apologize or making amends). For each of the guilt and shame
subscales, item averages were computed.
Control Measure. Mood was controlled for using the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al, 1988). The scale is composed of twenty adjectives, 10 positive
adjectives (e.g., interested; α = .90) and 10 negative adjectives (e.g., upset; α = .87). For each
adjective, the participants are asked to rate how much they feel it on a 5 point scale, 1 being not
at all and 5 being extremely. Item averages were computed for the positive and negative affect
subscales.
Demographics. Additionally, participants were asked basic demographic information
including age, sex, and ethnicity (see Appendix A).
Results
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Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. All variables were assessed for normality (i.e.,
skewness and kurtosis) and were relatively normally distributed. The means, standard
deviations, and reliabilities for all measures are presented in Table 1.
Zero-Order Correlations. Zero-order correlations for all measures can be found in
Table 2. The zero-order correlations were examined to identify general patterns rather than to
point out the significance of individual correlations. As expected, the measures of disgust
sensitivity and fear of contamination were consistently positively correlated with the measures of
shame (rs ranging from .13 to .49). Additionally, disgust and fear of contamination were
positively related to guilt, although these correlations were not consistent across measures. Guilt
was consistently correlated only with sexual disgust (rs = .13-.38) and moral disgust (rs = .30.36). The shame and guilt measures were highly intercorrelated (rs = .33 & .57). Negative affect
was significantly positively correlated with some of the measures of disgust (i.e., the DPSS-R
subscales; rs = .17 & .21), but not correlated with other measures (i.e., DS and TDDS; rs = .01.06). Negative affect was not significantly correlated with shame (rs = .06 & .14), but the
correlations were in the anticipated directions and some were approaching significance.
Unexpectedly, negative affect was negatively correlated with guilt (rs = -.16 & -.17).1 Positive
affect was not significantly correlated with any of the measures of disgust (rs = -.01-.07) or
shame (rs = -.05 & -.10). It was, however, significantly positively correlated with guilt (rs = .13
& .18).
Partial Correlations. In order to ensure that the relation between shame and disgust was
specific to shame, guilt and negative affect were partialled out of the correlations. Additionally,
separate analyses were conducted to examine the relation between guilt and disgust. For those
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analyses, both shame and negative affect were partialled out of the correlations. The partial
correlations are presented in Table 3.2
As hypothesized, disgust sensitivity and fear of contamination were positively correlated
with shame even after controlling for guilt and negative affect. The only measure of disgust that
was not correlated with shame was moral disgust. These results suggest that the relation between
disgust and shame involves physical or bodily contamination rather than symbolic moral
contamination. Interestingly, the Negative Self-Evaluation subscale of the GASP, which assess
global self-condemnation (i.e., negative attitudes toward the self), was the only indicator of
shame that was not significantly correlated with disgust and fear of contamination. On the other
hand, disgust and fear of contamination were strongly correlated with the Withdraw subscale,
which assesses an individual’s desire to avoid situations that could induce shame (i.e., social
contract or moral violations). These results suggest that disgust may play an important role in
the motivational processes that are involved in avoiding situations that can cause shame. In other
words, people may be encouraged to avoid contact with others following a moral or social
contract violation because of the risk of being perceived as a source of contamination. This
interpretation is consistent with Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa’s (2011) work, which suggests that
perceiving disgusted faces as opposed to angry faces induces feelings of shame.
Guilt was not consistently correlated with the disease-avoidance components of disgust
(i.e., core/pathogen and sexual disgust) and fear of contamination, when controlling for shame
and negative affect. However, guilt was consistently positively correlated with moral disgust.
Although this finding was not hypothesized, it is consistent with the literature which describes
guilt as a moral emotion that is concerned with social contract violations (Tangney et al., 2007).
Discussion

SHAME AND DISGUST

26

Study 1 provided initial correlational evidence that there is a unique relation between
disgust and shame. Disgust and fear of contamination were consistently positively correlated
with shame even after controlling for guilt and negative affect. However, guilt was generally not
correlated with the disease-avoidant components of disgust and contamination. These findings
provided partial evidence that shame may involve disgust. Nevertheless, Study 1 was limited in
that it was a correlational design and therefore unable to provide any evidence for a causal
relation between disgust and shame.
Additionally, Study 1 provided some evidence that moral disgust as opposed to the other
disgust sensitivity measures (i.e., pathogen/core disgust and sexual disgust) was consistently
positively correlated with guilt propensity even after controlling for shame propensity and
negative affect. Interestingly, moral disgust was the only measure of disgust sensitivity that was
not correlated with shame propensity. This finding is consistent with the primary distinction
between shame and guilt (i.e., that shame is characterized by self-evaluation whereas guilt is
characterized by behavioral-evaluation; Niedenthal et al., 1994). As moral disgust is a
behavioral-evaluation (i.e., how disgusted an individual is by social contract violations), it makes
sense that moral disgust was correlated with guilt proneness but not shame proneness.
Study 2
The purpose of Study 2 was to extend the findings of Study 1 by testing a causal model in
which inducing disgust increases shame. If shame is an emotional experience that emerges from
feeling disgust with the self and perceiving the self as a source of contamination, inducing
disgust should trigger shame. More specifically, it was hypothesized that inducing disgust via a
subliminal prime would increase shame propensity and sensitivity. Again, the effect was
hypothesized to be specific to shame, so the disgust induction was not expected to affect feelings
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of guilt. Moreover, the effect was expected to be specific to disgust and not the result of general
negative affect. That is, it was hypothesized that inducing disgust would result in more shame
than both a neutral condition and a condition in which a negative mood state was induced.
Method
Participants
The participants were 175 introductory to psychology students from Virginia
Commonwealth University (62% female) who received course credit for their participation.
They ranged in age from 18 to 41 years-of-age (M = 19.29, SD = 2.61). Forty-seven percent of
the sample was White, 25% were African-American, 17% were Asian, 6% were Hispanic, and
the remaining 5% were ’Other’ or undisclosed.
Measures and Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants completed an informed consent form. Next, they
completed the priming task, which was masked as a lexical decision task. Following the priming
task, the participants completed the same battery of questionnaires that was used in Study 1, with
the addition of the Perceived Vulnerability to Disease (PVD) scale (Duncan et al., 2009; see
Appendix A). First, participants completed the measures of shame and guilt, followed by the
disgust and contamination measures, then the PANAS, and lastly the demographic questions.
Finally, the participants were debriefed. They were told what the true purpose of the study was
(i.e., examining the relation between shame and disgust) and they were also informed that the
purpose of the deception was to ensure that their responding was not influenced by an awareness
of the study’s true purpose. Finally, they were given credit and thanked for their participation.
Subliminal Priming. The priming procedure was accomplished through a lexical
decision task. The participants were introduced to the lexical decision task as a word game.
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They were told that the purpose of the word game was to assess their ability to recognize words.
They were presented with strings of letters and asked to indicate as quickly as possible whether
each string of letters was a word or nonword. Prior to each letter string, participants were
subliminally primed with either neutral, negative, or disgusting words.
Following the procedure used by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (2008), each trial included a
50ms premask (XXXXXX), a 17ms prime, a 50ms postmask (XXXXXX), and the target string
of letters. For half of the trials, the target word was a random string of letters (e.g., “tsers”). The
remaining trials contained a neutral word (e.g., book). Participants were randomly assigned to
one of three conditions (i.e., disgust, negative, or neutral). Each condition contained 10 primes
and each prime was repeated 5 times for a total of 50 trials.
The priming words were matched as closely as possible for length (i.e., number of letters)
and starting letter. For the disgust condition, participants were primed with words that evoke
bodily disgust (e.g., diarrhea, urine). The participants in the negative condition were primed
with words that evoke negativity (e.g., disappointing, useless). Finally, those in the neutral
condition were primed with words that do not evoke an emotional response (e.g., door, unit).
See Appendix B for the complete list of words that were used for the priming procedure.
Disgust and Contamination Concerns. Since disgust sensitivity has been shown to
predict reactivity to disgusting stimuli (van Overveld et al., 2010), there was reason to believe
that the efficacy of the disgust manipulation might depend on individual difference in disgust
sensitivity and contamination concerns. Thus, participants completed measures of disgust
sensitivity and fear of contamination. The DS (Haidt et al., 1994) and the TDDS (Tybur et al.,
2009), which were used in Study 1, were used to assess disgust sensitivity.
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Additionally, the Perceived Vulnerability to Disease (PVD) scale was used to assess
germ aversion ( = .74) and perceived infectability ( = .87; Duncan et al., 2009). The scale
contains two subscales, an 8-item measure of germ aversion (e.g., “I prefer to wash my hands
pretty soon after shanking someone’s hand.”) and a 7-item measure of perceived infectability
(e.g., “If an illness is ‘going around,’ I will get it.”). Participants were asked to respond to items
on a 7-point scale, 1 being strongly disagree and 7 being strongly agree. Item averages were
calculated for the perceived infectability and germ aversion subscales.
Shame and Guilt Measures. Shame and guilt were assessed using the same measures as
Study 1, the TOSCA (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) and the GASP (Cohen et al., 2011).
Control Measures. Mood was controlled for using the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988).
Finally, participants were asked basic demographic information (e.g., age, sex, ethnicity).
Manipulation Check. An additional item was added to the PANAS as a manipulation
check. Participants were asked how disgusted they felt on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5
(extremely).
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. All variables were assessed for normality (i.e.,
skewness and kurtosis) and were relatively normally distributed. The means, standard
deviations, and reliabilities for all measures are presented in Table 4.
Manipulation Check. There were no differences in self-reported disgust across the three
conditions, F(2, 172) = 0.95, p > .05. Participants in the neutral (M = 1.31, SD = .73), negative
(M = 1.50, SD = .93), and disgust (M = 1.33, SD = .70) conditions reported comparable levels of
disgust. However, the PANAS, which included the disgust manipulation check, was the last
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measure that the participants completed. The effect of the manipulation may have worn off prior
to completion of the manipulation check.
Primary Analyses. The data were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression
following the procedure outlined by Aiken and West (1991). As there were multiple, highly
correlated indicators of disgust sensitivity, shame, and guilt, composites variables were created
for each of the constructs.3 The disgust sensitivity composite was created by standardizing and
taking the average of all of the disease-avoidance components of disgust (i.e., DS, TDDSPathogen, TDDS-Sexual, and the Germ Aversion subscale of the PVD; rs = .36-.69). Likewise,
indexes of shame and guilt were created by standardizing and averaging their respective
subscales from the TOSCA and GASP (r = .65 for shame measures, r = .73 for guilt measures).
Two dummy coded condition variables were created following the steps outlined in Aiken and
West (1991). For the first dummy coded variable, the disgust and negative conditions were
coded as 0 and the neutral condition was coded as 1, which tested the main effect of the disgust
manipulation relative to the neutral condition. For the second dummy coded variable, the disgust
and neutral conditions were coded as 0 and the negative condition was coded as 1, which tested
the main effect of the disgust manipulation relative to the negative condition. As both of these
dummy coded variables shared the contrast between the negative and neutral conditions, that
effect was partialled out.
In order to ensure that the effect was not due to a general state of negative mood, the
negative affect subscale of the PANAS was entered in the first step of the regression model. The
dummy coded condition variables and the disgust sensitivity composite were entered in the
second step of the analysis. Finally, interaction terms between the condition and the disgust
sensitivity composite variables was created by standardizing the disgust sensitivity variable and
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multiplying it by each condition variable. These interaction terms were added into the third step
of the hierarchical regression model.
Shame as the Dependent Variable. There was a main effect for the disgust sensitivity
composite ( = .31, p < .001, R2 change = .09, See Table 5). This replicated the findings of
Study 1, suggesting that disgust was positively correlated with shame. As in Study 1, the effect
remained significant even when controlling for guilt ( = .15, p = .03). There was, however, no
main effect for condition. Participants in the disgust condition did not experience more shame
than either participants in the neutral condition ( = -.01, p = .95) or the negative condition ( = .01, p = .92). There was a significant interaction between the disgust sensitivity composite and
condition. The interaction was significant both when the disgust condition was compared to the
neutral condition ( = -.27, p < .001, R2 change = .05) and the negative condition ( = -.23, p =
.02). When comparing the disgust condition to the neutral condition, the interaction remained
significant even after controlling for guilt ( = -.21, p = .01). When comparing the disgust
condition to the negative condition, the interaction became nonsignificant when controlling for
guilt ( = -.13, p = .12). The interaction is displayed in Figure 1. An analysis of simple slopes
indicated that at high levels of disgust sensitivity (i.e., + 1 SD), the disgust manipulation
significantly increased shame when compared to the neutral condition ( = .28, p = .03).
Likewise, at high levels of disgust sensitivity, the manipulation led to a marginally significant
increase in shame compared to the negative condition ( = .23, p = .07). In other words, for
those who were more sensitive to disgust, the disgust manipulation increased shame.
At low levels of disgust sensitivity (i.e., - 1 SD), the disgust manipulation led to a
marginally significant decrease in shame compared to the neutral condition ( = -.22, p = .08).
Likewise, at low levels of disgust sensitivity, the disgust manipulation significantly decreased
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shame compared to the negative condition ( = -.30, p = .02). That is, those who were less
sensitive to disgust experienced less shame following the disgust induction
Guilt as the Dependent Variable. As the effect of disgust was expected to be specific
to shame, the same regression procedure was conducted using guilt as the dependent measure.
The results for the guilt analysis indicated that there was a main effect for the disgust sensitivity
composite ( = .33, p < .001, R2 change = .11, See Table 6). In contrast to Study 1, the effect
remained significant after controlling for shame and negative affect ( = .17, p = .01). There
was, however, no main effect for condition. Participants in the disgust condition did not
experience more guilt than participants in either the neutral ( = -.01, p = .95) or the negative
condition ( = .06, p = .49). There was a significant interaction between disgust sensitivity and
condition. The interaction was significant only when the disgust condition was compared to the
neutral condition ( = -.21, p = .03, R2 change = .03). It was not significant when the disgust
condition was contrasted with the negative condition ( = -.12, p = .19). More importantly, the
interaction became nonsignificant when shame was controlled ( = -.10, p = .27).
Discussion
Although there was no evidence for a main effect of the disgust manipulation, Study 2
provided initial evidence that inducing disgust increased shame for individuals who were
sensitive to disgust. These results were significant even after controlling for negative affect and
guilt. Moreover, the effect seemed to be particular to shame and disgust. When guilt was
analyzed as the dependent variable, there was a significant interaction such that for those who
were more sensitive to disgust, the induction increased guilt, but only compared to the neutral
condition. Importantly, however, the effect became nonsignificant when shame was controlled,
highlighting the unique relationship between shame and disgust.
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Another interesting, but unexpected, finding from Study 2 was that for those low in
disgust sensitivity, inducing disgust led to a reduction in shame. One possible explanation for
this unanticipated finding is that the participants were not internalizing the disgust reaction as
those who are less sensitive to disgust are also less likely to be sensitive to shame. In other
words, it may be a contrast effect in which participants less sensitive to disgust were less likely
to associate disgust with the self. Thus, self-evaluations may have been more positive in contrast
to feelings of disgust induced by the priming procedure.
Study 3
If the experience of shame stems from perceiving the self as a source of disgust and
contamination, reducing disgust and contamination concerns should result in a reduction of
shame. Indeed, other researchers have had success priming purity to reverse the effects of
disgust. Schnall and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that although priming disgust increases the
severity of moral decision making, priming cleanliness (i.e., having participants wash their
hands) encouraged less severe moral reactivity. Thus, the primary purpose of Study 3 was to
evaluate whether subliminally priming purity would result in decreased shame propensity and
sensitivity. Priming was accomplished using the same lexical decision task as Study 2, with the
addition of two conditions (i.e., purity and positivity). The positivity prime was included in
order to ensure that any effect was specific to purity and not simply due to positivity. A
secondary goal of Study 3 was to replicate the findings of Study 2 in a different sample (i.e.,
WVU students). In other words, it was hypothesized that for those who are sensitive to disgust,
subliminally inducing disgust would increase shame propensity and sensitivity compared to both
negative and neutral conditions, whereas subliminally inducing purity would decrease shame
propensity and sensitivity compared to both positive and neutral conditions.
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Participants
The participants were 272 introductory to psychology students from West Virginia
University (68% female) who received course credit for their participation. They ranged in age
from 18 to 37 years-of-age (M = 19.88, SD = 2.62). Eighty-five percent of the sample was
White, 7% were African-American, 3% were Asian, 2% were Hispanic, and the remaining 3%
were ’Other’ or undisclosed.
Procedure
The procedure for Study 3 was virtually identical to Study 2 except for the addition of
two subliminal priming conditions (i.e., purity and positive). As in the previous studies,
participants first completed an informed consent form. Following the consent procedure,
participants completed the lexical decision task as outlined in Study 2. Participants were
randomly assigned to either a purity, positive, disgust, or neutral condition. In the purity
condition, the primes were related to cleanliness (e.g., clean, pure). In the positive condition, the
primes were evocative of positivity (e.g., happy, joy). For the disgust, negative, and neutral
conditions, the primes were the same as those that were used in Study 2. See Appendix B for a
complete list of the priming words.
After the participants finished the lexical decision task, they completed the same series of
questionnaires that were used in Study 2 (see Appendix A for the complete measures). Disgust
and contamination concerns were assessed using the DS (Haidt et al., 1994), TDDS (Tybur et al.,
2009), DPSS-R (van Overveld et al., 2006), the PI-COWC (Burns et al., 1996) and the PVD
(Duncan et al., 2009). Shame and guilt were measured using the TOSCA (Tangney & Dearing,
2002) and the GASP (Cohen et al., 2011). Mood was controlled for using the PANAS (Watson
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et al., 1988). A disgust item was imbedded in the PANAS as a manipulation check. Lastly,
participants were asked basic demographic information (e.g., age, sex, ethnicity etc.). As in
Study 2, upon completing the study participants were informed of the true purpose of the
research (i.e., examining the relation between shame and disgust). They were debriefed about
the subliminal prime and told that the purpose of the deception was to ensure that the knowledge
of the study did not influence their responses. Finally, they were given credit and thanked for
their participation.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. All variables were assessed for skewness and
kurtosis and were relatively normally distributed. Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s
alphas for all measures are presented in Table 7.
Manipulation Check. There were no differences in self-reported disgust across the five
conditions, F(4, 267) = 0.96, p > .05. Participants in the neutral (M = 1.20, SD = .59), negative
(M = 1.18, SD = .60), disgust (M = 1.35, SD = .77), positive (M = 1.20, SD = .49), and purity (M
= 1.15, SD = .45) conditions reported comparable levels of disgust. As in Study 2, the
manipulation check was imbedded in the PANAS, which was the last measure that participants
completed. The effect of the manipulation may have worn off prior to completion of the
manipulation check.
Comparison of all Conditions. As in the previous study, composite variables were
created for disgust, shame, and guilt. The indicators for each of the respective constructs were
highly intercorrelated and the primary analyses that were conducted were relatively consistent
across each individual indicator. Thus, only the analyses with the composite variables are
reported. Participant sex also did not affect the results of the analyses. The composite variables
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for disgust (i.e., DS, TDDS-Pathogen, TDDS-Sexual, DPSS-R, and the Germ Aversion subscale
of the PVD; rs = .22-.72), shame (i.e., the shame subscales of the TOSCA and GASP, r = .58),
and guilt (i.e., the guilt subscales of the TOSCA and GASP, r = .63) were constructed by
standardizing and averaging the measures for each of the constructs.
First, separate ANCOVAs were conducted to evaluate whether the manipulation had an
effect on shame or guilty. Negative affect and disgust sensitivity were included as covariates.
There was no evidence of a main effect for the shame analysis, F(4, 265) = 2.14, p > .05.
Participants in the Neutral (M = .18, SD = .98), Negative (M = .03, SD = .99), Disgust (M = -.22,
SD = .96), Positive (M = .12, SD = .98), and Purity (M = -.14, SD = 1.06) conditions reported
comparable levels of shame. Additionally, there was no evidence of a main effect for the guilt
analysis, F(4, 265) = 1.53, p > .05. Participants in the Neutral (M = .06, SD = 1.04), Negative (M
= .09, SD = .84), Disgust (M = -.16, SD = 1.15), Positive (M = .19, SD = .78), and Purity (M = .19, SD = 1.18) conditions reported comparable levels of guilt.
In order to test for interactions between the manipulations and disgust sensitivity, the data
were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression following the same procedure that was
outlined in Study 2 (see Aiken & West, 1991). For ease of interpretation and in order to address
the study hypotheses, separate analyses were conducted examining purity as the comparison
variable (i.e., comparing the purity condition to the neutral and positive conditions) and disgust
as the comparison variable (i.e., comparing the disgust condition to the neutral and negative
conditions). Likewise, separate analyses were conducted examining shame and guilt as
dependent variables. When purity was the comparison condition, a dummy variable was created
in which purity and positivity were coded as 0 and neutral was coded as 1, and a second dummy
coded variable was created in which purity and neutral were coded as 0 and positivity was coded
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as 1. The same procedure was followed when disgust was examined as the comparison
condition. Two dummy coded variables were created, one in which disgust and negative were
coded as 0 and neutral was coded as 1, and another variable in which disgust and neutral were
coded as 0 and negative was coded as 1. For all of the analyses, negative affect was entered in
step one as a control variable, the disgust sensitivity composite and the dummy coded variables
were entered in step two, and finally, the interaction terms (i.e., disgust sensitivity composite x
dummy variables) were entered in step three.
Analysis of Purity Induction. When shame was explored as the dependent variable,
there was a main effect for the disgust sensitivity composite ( = .51, p < .01, R2 change = .26,
See Table 8), which remained significant when controlling for guilt ( = .43, p < .01). There was
no main effect for condition. That is, the purity manipulation did not decrease disgust compared
to either the neutral ( = .10, p = .17) or positive ( = .11, p = .15) conditions. The interaction
between condition and disgust sensitivity was also not significant when the purity condition was
compared to the neutral condition ( = -.03, p = .71, R2 change = .01) or the positive condition (
= -.13, p = .18).
When guilt was the dependent variable, there was a main effect for the disgust sensitivity
composite ( = .32, p < .01, R2 change = .12). The effect became nonsignificant when
controlling for shame ( = .03, p = .75). There was no main effect for condition when the purity
condition was compared to the neutral condition ( = .08, p = .37). There was, however, a main
effect when the purity condition was compared to the positive condition (i.e., the purity condition
did experience less guilt than the positive condition;  = .17, p = .05). The effect became
nonsignificant when shame was controlled ( = .11, p = .15). There was no evidence of an
interaction. The interaction between the manipulation and the disgust sensitivity composite was
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nonsignificant both when the purity condition was compared to the neutral condition ( = .05, p
= .62, R2 change = .00) and the positive condition ( = .02, p = .86).
Analysis of Disgust Induction. For the shame analysis, there was a main effect for the
disgust sensitivity composite ( = .47, p < .01, R2 change = .25, See Table 9). This replicated the
findings of both Studies 1 and 2, suggesting that disgust was positively correlated with shame.
As in the previous studies, the effect remained significant when controlling for guilt ( = .42, p <
.01). There was also a main effect for condition. However, the effect was in the opposite
direction as hypothesized. Participants in the disgust condition experienced less shame than both
the participants in the neutral ( = .18, p = .02) and negative conditions ( = .15, p = .05). The
main effect for disgust compared to the negative condition remained significant ( = .16, p = .04)
even after controlling for guilt. When compared to the neutral condition, it was nonsignificant (
= .12, p = .12) after controlling for guilt. Unlike Study 2, there was no evidence of an
interaction. The interaction was nonsignificant both when the disgust condition was compared to
the neutral condition ( = .08, p = .38, R2 change = .00) and the negative condition ( = .05, p =
.61).
For the guilt analysis, there was a main effect for the disgust sensitivity composite ( =
.32, p < .01, R2 change = .12). However, as in Study 1, the effect became nonsignificant when
shame was controlled ( = .04, p = .64). There was no main effect of the disgust induction when
compared to either the neutral ( = .10, p = .28) or negative conditions ( = .13, p = .15). There
was also no evidence of an interaction when the disgust condition was compared to the neutral
condition ( = -.04, p = .97, R2 change = .05). There was evidence of an interaction when the
disgust condition was compared to the negative condition ( = -.26, p = .01). The interaction
suggested that for those who were less sensitive to disgust, those in the negative condition
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experienced more guilt than those in the disgust condition, but for those who were more sensitive
to disgust, those in the disgust condition experienced more guilt than those in the negative
condition. The interaction remained significant even after controlling for shame ( = -.27, p <
.01).
Discussion
Although the effect of the purity manipulation was in the predicted direction (i.e.,
participants in the purity condition experienced less shame compared to the positive and neutral
conditions), the effect was not significant. Thus, it appears that subliminally priming purity did
not decrease explicitly (i.e., consciously) reported shame sensitivity and propensity. One
potential explanation for the ineffectiveness of the purity prime may be that the prime was too
weak to reduce the participants’ baseline disgust sensitivity levels. A more effective purity
manipulation may have been to have participants wash their hands, which has previously been
shown to reduce disgust (Schnall et al., 2008).
Furthermore, the main effect of the disgust manipulation resulted in the opposite effect of
what was anticipated. Those in the disgust condition experienced less shame compared to the
neutral and negative conditions. This was in direct contrast with the correlations across Studies
1, 2, and 3, which consistently suggested that disgust sensitivity was positively correlated with
shame propensity-. Moreover, it was in contrast to the interaction in Study 2, which suggested
that inducing disgust increased shame for those who were more sensitive to disgust. It is unclear
why the results of Study 3 were in stark contrast to Study 2.
One possible explanation may lie in the environment in which the experiments took
place. Study 2 took place at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) and the sessions were
conducted in group setting (i.e., participants completed the study in an environment in which
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other participants were present). Study 3 took place at West Virginia University (WVU) and the
participants completed the study in private rooms (i.e., participants completed the study alone).
The reason that this variation may have played a key role in that public exposure may be
necessary for shame to take place (see Tangney et al., 2007). That is, other people are required
to be present in order for shame to be induced.
Another possible explanation for the inconsistencies between Studies 2 and 3 is that
different samples were used (i.e., VCU vs WVU). It is, however, not clear what role the
difference in samples would have played in these divergent results. When the means and
standard deviations for the VCU and WVU samples were compared, they were very similar
suggesting that there is little reason to believe that the samples differ in terms of disgust
sensitivity or shame proneness.
Study 4
The purpose of Study 4 was to evaluate whether a more ecologically valid manipulation
(i.e., a form of disgust that one might encounter in everyday life) would increase shame
propensity and sensitivity. As disgust is generally thought to function as a disease-avoidance
mechanism that promotes avoidance of potentially contaminated food (Oaten et al., 2009) and is
thought to be intimately linked to the senses of taste and smell, in Study 4, disgust was induced
directly via the gustatory route. More specifically, half of the participants consumed a disgusting
flavored (e.g., barf) jelly bean whereas the other half ate a regularly flavored (e.g., peach) jelly
bean. As in the previous studies, negative affect and guilt were controlled. It was hypothesized
that those who consumed the disgusting flavored jelly beans would exhibit more shame than
those who ate the pleasant flavored jelly beans.
Method
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Participants
The participants were 181 introductory to psychology students from West Virginia
University (68% female) who received course credit for their participation. They ranged in age
from 18 to 39 years-of-age (M = 19.55, SD = 2.48). Eighty-four percent of the sample was
White, 5% were African-American, 3% were Asian, 3% were Hispanic, and the remaining 4%
were ‘Other’ or undisclosed.
Measures and Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants first completed an informed consent form. Once the
consent form was completed, they participated in what they believed to be a taste test in which
they were asked to describe how several jelly beans tasted and rate their pleasantness. The
pleasantness ratings of the jelly beans were averaged and used as a manipulation check. The real
objective of the taste test, however, was to experimentally induce disgust. Participants were
randomly assigned to either disgusting flavored jelly beans (i.e., barf) or regularly flavored jelly
beans (i.e., peach). The unpleasantly flavored jelly beans are manufactured by JellyBelly as part
of their Harry Potter and Bean Boozled collections. They are visually indistinguishable from the
regularly flavored jelly beans. After eating the jelly beans, the participants were asked to
describe the taste of the jelly beans in a brief essay and then rate the taste of the jelly beans (e.g.,
how much do you like the jelly bean?, how good do the jelly beans taste?).
Once the participants completed the taste test, they were asked to complete a series of
questionnaires. The same measures from Studies 2 and 3 were used (see Appendix A for
complete measures). Disgust and contamination concerns were assessed using the DS (Haidt et
al., 1994), TDDS (Tybur et al., 2009), DPSS-R (van Overveld et al., 2006), the PI-COWC
(Burns et al., 1996) and the PVD (Duncan et al., 2009). Shame and guilt were assessed with the
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TOSCA (Tangney & Dearing, 2002) and the GASP (Cohen et al., 2011). Mood was controlled
for using the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988). As in Studies 2 and 3, a disgust item was embedded
in the PANAS as a manipulation check. For an additional manipulation check, participants were
asked to report how disgusted they were by the jelly bean on a scale from 1 (not disgusted at all)
to 7 (very disgusted). Lastly, participants were asked some basic demographic information (e.g.,
age, sex, ethnicity). Upon completion of the study, participants were informed of the true nature
of the study, given research credit, and thanked for their participation.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Reliability. All variables were assessed for skewness and
kurtosis and were relatively normally distributed. Means, standard deviations, and Cronbach’s
alphas for all measures are presented in Table 10.
Manipulation Check. Participants in the disgust condition (i.e., barf flavored jelly bean)
found the jelly bean more unpleasant (M = 5.80, SD = 1.19) than those in the control condition
(M = 2.27, SD = 1.33), t(179) = 18.78, p < .01. Additionally, participants in the disgust
condition (M = 5.10, SD = 1.82) reported being more disgusted by the jelly bean than the control
group (M = 1.38, SD = .86), t(179) = -17.44, p < .01. There was, however, no difference in selfreported disgust (i.e., the disgust item that was embedded in the PANAS). Those in the disgust
condition (M = 1.46, SD = .82) reported about the same level of disgust as those in the control
condition (M = 1.38, SD = .70), t(179) = -0.77, p = .44.
Primary Analyses. The data were analyzed following the same procedure as Studies 2
and 3 (i.e., hierarchical multiple regression; see Aiken & West, 1991). Participant sex did not
alter the results of the analyses, so the reported analyses do not include sex as a variable.
Separate analyses were conducted for both shame and guilt. As in the previous studies,
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composites were created of disgust, shame, and guilt. The indicators of each of the respective
constructs were highly intercorrelated and the primary analyses were relatively consistent across
the individual measures. Composite variables for disgust (i.e., DS, TDDS-Pathogen, TDDSSexual, DPSS-R, and the Germa Aversion subscale of the PVD, rs = .20-.71), shame (i.e., the
shame subscales of the TOSCA and GASP, r = .57), and guilt (i.e., the guilt subscales of the
TOSCA and GASP, r = .68) were constructed by standardizing and averaging the measures for
each of the constructs. A dummy coded variable was created for condition in which the disgust
condition was coded as 1 and the control condition was coded as 0. An interaction term was
computed by multiplying the disgust sensitivity composite by the dummy coded condition
variable. For all of the analyses, negative affect was entered as a control variable in step 1, the
disgust sensitivity composite and the condition variable were entered in step 2, and the
interaction term was entered in step 3.
Shame as the Dependent Variable. For the shame analysis, the disgust sensitivity
composite emerged as a significant predictor (i.e., disgust was positively correlated with shame;

 = .49, p < .01, R2 change = .24, See Table 11). As in the previous studies, this effect remained
significant after controlling for guilt ( = .38, p < .01). There was no main effect for condition
(i.e., the manipulation did not have a significant effect on shame;  = .03, p = .68). There was,
however, evidence of a significant interaction between disgust sensitivity and the manipulation
( = -.23, p = .01, R2 change = .03; see Figure 2). The interaction remained marginally
significant even after controlling for guilt ( = -.16, p = .06). An analysis of simple slopes
indicated that for those who were less sensitive to disgust (i.e., -1 SD), the disgust manipulation
led to a marginally significant increase in shame ( = .16, p = .07). However, for those who
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were more sensitive to disgust (i.e., +1 SD), the manipulation led to a nonsignificant reduction in
shame ( = -.12, p = .19).
Guilt as the Dependent Variable. For the guilt analysis, the disgust sensitivity
composite emerged as a significant predictor (i.e., disgust was positively correlated with guilt; 
= .36, p < .01, R2 change = .13). The correlation was attenuated when controlling for shame ( =
.18, p = .02). There was no main effect for condition (i.e., the manipulation did not have a
significant effect on guilt;  = .05, p = .48). However, the same interaction that emerged with
the shame analysis emerged in the guilt analysis ( = -.24, p = .02, R2 change = .03). The
interaction became nonsignificant when shame was controlled ( = -.16, p = .10). An analysis of
simple slopes indicated that for those who were less sensitive to disgust (i.e., -1 SD), the disgust
manipulation led to a significant increase in guilt ( = .23, p = .02). However, for those who
were more sensitive to disgust (i.e., +1 SD), the manipulation led to a nonsignificant reduction in
guilt ( = -.12, p = .19; see Figure 2).
Discussion
As in the previous three studies, disgust sensitivity emerged as a significant predictor of
shame even after controlling for guilt and negative affect. However, the disgust manipulation
did not have a significant effect on shame. Even more perplexing, there was an interaction
between disgust sensitivity and the manipulation such that for those who were less sensitive to
disgust, the manipulation led to a marginally significant increase in shame. This is in direct
contrast to Study 2, in which the disgust manipulation increased shame for those who were more
sensitive to disgust. These divergent results may be explained by the nature of the manipulation.
In Study 2, the disgust manipulation was subliminal (i.e., unconscious) and thus, the participants
may have misattributed the source of their disgust to the self, resulting in increased shame.
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However, in the current study, the manipulation was supraliminal (i.e., conscious). Thus, it may
be that in the current study those who were sensitive to disgust attributed the disgust to the jelly
bean rather than the self (i.e., shame) because they were aware of the source of their disgust.
General Discussion
Across all 4 studies, shame and disgust were positively correlated (i.e., those who were
sensitive to disgust were sensitive to shame and vice versa). More importantly, in all of the
studies, disgust sensitivity was a significant predictor of shame even after controlling for guilt
and negative affect, emphasizing that the relation between disgust and shame is unique. That is,
the relation between disgust and shame was not due to general negative affect (i.e., that they are
both negatively valenced emotions) and the same pattern was not seen with shame’s sibling
emotion, guilt. Interestingly, however, guilt was consistently positively correlated with sexual
and moral disgust even after controlling for shame and negative affect. This effect may be due to
the fact shame and guilt differ in regard to the nature of their self-conscious evaluations. For
shame, the self is the object of the negative evaluations whereas for guilt, the behavior serves as
the attitude-object (Niedenthal et al., 1994). Thus, guilt may be predictive of both moral and
sexual disgust because they concern negative behavioral evaluations (i.e., being disgusted by
sexual activity and social contract violations).
Study 2 provided some support for a causal relation between disgust and shame.
Although there was no main effect for the disgust induction (i.e., inducing disgust did not
increase shame for all participants), the disgust manipulation increased shame for individuals
who were more sensitive to disgust. However, these findings were not replicated in Study 3. In
fact, the findings in Study 3 were in direct contrast with the hypothesis. The disgust
manipulation led to a reduction in shame compared to the neutral and negative conditions. The
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methodologies for Studies 2 and 3 were virtually identical, which makes these results puzzling.
One potential explanation for this quizzical finding is the context in which the study was
conducted. Study 2 was conducted in a group setting (i.e., participants completed the study in
the presence of other participants and the experimenter) whereas in Study 3, the participants
completed the study alone (i.e., in a private room in the absence of the experimenter and other
participants). As the experience of shame is thought to require public exposure (i.e., the
presence of others; Tangney et al., 2007), it may be the absence of others in Study 3 inhibited
participants from experiencing shame.
If shame is experienced as disgust with the self, then it follows that reducing disgust
should reduce shame. The results of Study 3, however, failed to provide evidence that inducing
purity would reduce shame. Although the results were in the predicted direction (i.e.,
participants in the purity condition experienced less shame than those in the neutral and positive
conditions), the effect was nonsignificant. Thus, there was no evidence that reducing disgust
relieves the experience of shame. Again, the fact that participants completed the study
individually in private rooms may have diluted the effect.
Study 4 also provided some puzzling results. Although there was no main effect for the
disgust manipulation (i.e., the barf flavored jelly beans did not induce increase shame for all of
the participants), there was a significant interaction such that for those who were less sensitive to
disgust, the manipulation increased shame. It did, however, not increase shame for those who
were more sensitive to disgust. These results were in direct opposition to Study 2, which found
that inducing disgust increased shame for those who were more sensitive to disgust. A potential
explanation for the conflicting findings of Studies 2 and 4 may be the nature of the manipulation.
In Study 2, disgust was manipulated subliminally (i.e., unconsciously), which may help explain
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why disgust increased shame for those who were sensitive to disgust (i.e., they were unaware of
the manipulation and thus misattributed the disgust to the self resulting in increased shame). On
the other hand, in Study 4, the manipulation was supraliminal (i.e., conscious). In this study, the
participants who were more sensitive to disgust may have been more able to identify the jelly
bean as the source of the disgust, whereas those who were less sensitive to disgust were not as
capable of identifying the source of the disgust. Thus, individuals who were less sensitive to
disgust misattributed the disgust to the self which resulted in increased shame. It is still,
however, somewhat unclear as to why individuals who were less sensitive to disgust
misattributed the disgust to the self in Study 4 but exhibited a contrasting effect in Study 2. This
may be partially explained by the route of the manipulation. In Study 4, the manipulation was
physically connected to the self (i.e., the self was contaminated via the ingestion of the jelly
bean), whereas in Study 2, the self or physical body did not come in contact with the source of
contamination. Consequently, there may have been a greater likelihood of attributing disgust to
the self in Study 4, particularly for those less sensitive to disgust.
Although the current studies provided consistent correlational evidence that there is a
unique relationship between shame and disgust (i.e., shame and disgust sensitvity were
consistently positively correlated in all 4 studies even after controlling for negative affect and
guilt), the experimental studies resulted in conflicting evidence in terms of the causal relationship
between shame and disgust. As a whole, these studies provided initial evidence for the relation
between shame and disgust, but it is clear that much more work needs to be done in order to
elucidate the exact nature of the relation between shame and disgust.
Limitations and Future Directions. One primary limitation of the current series of
studies is that disgust with the self was not directly manipulated. Studies 2, 3, and 4 induced
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disgust, but they did not directly link disgust with self. Future studies should evaluate whether
manipulating disgust toward the self (e.g., having participants imagine or recall scenarios in
which they got sick in public) results in more consistent findings. If shame is experienced as
disgust with the self, manipulations that evoke disgust with self should be more likely to
consistently increase shame.
Similarly, none of the studies in the current project directly assessed disgust with the self.
The correlations that were reported between shame and disgust only examined disgust propensity
and sensitivity. Overton and colleagues (2008) have developed a measure of self-disgust, which
contains items like “I find myself repulsive.” Future research should incorporate this measure.
If shame is experienced as disgust toward the self, self-disgust should be positively correlated
with shame.
Additionally, all of the studies assessed shame using explicit measures. Social
desirability can be a problem particularly for self-report measures of attitudes toward the self,
because people tend to engage in positive illusions (i.e., presenting the self in a more positive
light; Oakes, Brown, & Cai, 2008; Heatherton & Wyland, 2003). As shame is concerned with
negative self-evaluations, this positivity bias could be a problem for the current research because
it may make individuals less likely to report shame. Thus, the incorporation of implicit measures
may provide a more accurate assessment (i.e., a measure that is not affected by social
desirability) of shame. Moreover, implicit measures could be used to assess the extent to which
individuals associate disgust with the self. If shame is experienced as disgust with the self,
individuals who are sensitive to shame should categorize disgusting adjectives (e.g., repulsive)
more quickly than negative adjectives (e.g., unpleasant) following self primes (e.g., I or me).
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Some of the first research linking shame to disgust utilized facial expressions of emotions
(Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). Although Giner-Sorolla and Espinosa’s research examined
self-reported shame following exposure to a facial expression of disgust, an equally interesting
approach to analyzing the relation between disgust and shame may be to examine whether
priming individuals with disgust results in facial expressions of shame. Some recent research
has suggested that there may be some evidence of reliable facial expressions of shame (Widen,
Christy, Hewett, & Russell, 2011). If there is a unique relationship between disgust and shame,
publically exposing individuals to a disgusting stimulus should result in facial expressions of
shame.
Lastly, although the current studies presented consistent positive correlations between
shame and disgust sensitivity, these correlations may be explained by an unmeasured third
variable (e.g., behavioral inhibition or neuroticism). Both disgust and shame have been
correlated with behavioral inhibition or behavioral avoidance and neuroticism (Cohen et al.,
2011; Olatunji et al., 2008; Ulrich et al., 2006). Thus, future research should evaluate whether
the relation between disgust and shame persists even after controlling for behavioral inhibition
and neuroticism.
Conclusion. Although the results from the studies presented here were somewhat
inconsistent, they did provide some evidence for a link between shame and disgust (i.e., shame
and disgust sensitivity were consistently positively correlated even after controlling for negative
affect and guilt). Though additional work needs to be done in order to understand the causal
nature of this relation, it may have some important clinical implications for clients who suffer
from shame-related psychological disorders (e.g., body dysmorphic disorder and eating
disorders). Indeed, given the accumulation of evidence linking disgust sensitivity with anxiety
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disorders (see Olatunji & McKay, 2009), some researchers have already proposed reducing
disgust sensitivity as a measure of psychotherapy. Some evidence has indicated that habituation
to disgust can reduce disgust-related anxiety (Viar-Paxton, & Olatunji, 2012). If future
experimental evidence validates the causal relation between disgust and shame (i.e., if disgust
causes shame), these types of disgust reduction therapies may prove to be effective treatments
for shame-related psychological disorders. Additionally, if shame is experienced as disgust with
the self, it may help shed light on broader issues such as stigmatization (i.e., stigma may be
experienced as self-contamination). What is clear, however, is that more research needs to be
done to clarify the relation between disgust and shame.
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Footnotes

1

These results appear to be an anomaly. In Studies 2, 3, and 4, guilt was either positively

correlated with negative affect or not significantly correlated, as has been found in previous
research (Cohen et al., 2011).
2

Because there are significant sex differences in disgust and shame (i.e., females tend to

be more sensitive to disgust and shame; Druschel & Sherman, 1999; Lewis, 1971), analyses were
also conducted controlling for sex. Although the correlations were attenuated when sex was
controlled, they remained significant and remained in the predicted direction.
3

Separate analyses were conducted for each of the measures of shame, guilt, and disgust

sensitivity. As the results were relatively consistent across measures, only the analyses with the
composite variables are presented. Also, all of the effects remained significant even after
controlling for sex. Thus, analyses are reported collapsed across sex.
.
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Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for all Measures in Study 1.
M
SD

DS
2.70
0.52
.91
TDDS-Pathogen
4.10
1.14
.88
TDDS-Sexual
3.51
1.44
.84
TDDS-Moral
3.80
1.38
.81
DPSS-R
2.68
0.68
.88
Propensity Subscale
2.88
0.74
.85
Sensitivity Subscale
2.48
0.80
.82
PI-COWC
1.52
1.00
.92
TOSCA-Shame
2.99
0.68
.84
TOSCA-Guilt
3.98
0.66
.89
GASP-Shame
4.18
1.00
.79
NSE Subscale
5.16
1.31
.83
Withdraw Subscale
3.21
1.20
.76
GASP-Guilt
5.01
1.12
.84
NBE Subscale
4.72
1.37
.79
Repair Subscale
5.33
1.12
.73
PANAS-Negative Affect 1.71
0.69
.89
DS = Disgust Scale, TDDS = Three Domain Disgust Scale, DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and
Sensitivity Scale-Revised, PI-COWC = Checking Obsessions and Washing Compulsions
subscale of the Padua Inventory, TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect, GASP = Guilt and
Shame Proneness, NSE = Negative-Self-Evaluation, NBE = Negative-Behavior-Evaluation,
PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
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Table 2.
Zero-Order Correlations for all Measures in Study 1
r
Measure
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1. DS
.65** .62** .15*
.44**
.36** .43** .62** .29** .35*
.14
.41** .16*
.27** .36** .10
2. TDDS-Pathogen
.49** .17*
.42**
.34** .39** .49** .25** .27** .17*
.24** .11
.18*
.19** .12
3. TDDS-Sexual
.43** .29**
.13
.39** .48** .31** .33** .21** .32** .23** .29** .38** .13
4. TDDS-Moral
.18*
.10
.23** .21** .27** .32** .37** .13
.36** .41** .43** .30**
5. DPSS-R
.88** .89** .51** .45** .33** .14
.37** .03
.09
.13
.01
6. DPSS-Propensity
.57** .32** .31** .26** .11
.29** -.01
.03
.07
-.03
7. DPSS-Sensitivity
.56** .49** .32** .14
.37** .06
.13
.16*
.04
8. PI-COWC
.27** .24** .08
.29** .04
.15*
.24** .01
9. TOSCA-Shame
.53** .41** .43** .33** .27** .32** .16*
10. GASP-Shame
.81** .77** .38** .57** .61** .41**
11. NSE
.25** .52** .68** .63** .59**
12. Withdraw
.07
.20** .31** .02
13. TOSCA-Guilt
.63** .56** .58**
14. GASP-Guilt
.92** .88**
15. NBE
.61**
16. Repair
17. Negative Affect
*p < .05, **p < .01, DS = Disgust Scale, TDDS = Three Domain Disgust Scale, PVD = Perceived Vulnerability to Disease, TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious
Affect, GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness, NSE = Negative-Self-Evaluation, NBE = Negative-Behavior-Evaluation

17
.02
.01
.04
.03
.22**
.17*
.21**
.04
.06
.01
-.11
.14
-.17*
-.16*
-.15*
-.14*
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Table 3.
Partial Correlations of Shame and Guilt with Disgust for Study 1
Shame1
Guilt2
TOSCA GASPS NSE Withdraw Composite
TOSCA GASPS NBE Repair Composite
DS
.27**
.27**
-.01 .40**
.31**
.02
.09
.20*
-.06
.06
TDDS-Pathogen .25**
.24**
.12
.25**
.28**
-.01
.00
-.01
.00
-.01
TDDS-Sexual
.28**
.24**
.03
.31**
.30**
.12
.14
.23** .01
.15
TDDS-Moral
.12
.10
.11
.05
.13
.30**
.32**
.34** .22**
.35**
DPSS-R
.47**
.34**
.13
.37**
.47**
-.12
-.16
-.12
-.15
-.16
Propensity
.33**
.26**
.12
.26**
.35**
-.08
-.11
-.08
-.11
-.11
Sensitivity
.51**
.35**
.11
.40**
.50**
-.13
-.17*
-.14
-.16*
-.17*
PI-COWC
.29**
.28**
.07
.34**
.33**
-.14
-.06
.05
-.17*
-.11
*p < .05, ** p < .01, DS = Disgust Scale, TDDS = Three Domain Disgust Scale, DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity ScaleRevised, PI-COWC = Checking Obsessions and Washing Compulsions subscale of the Padua Inventory
1
Controlling for guilt and negative affect
2
Controlling for shame and negative affect
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for all Measures in Study 2.
M
SD

DS
2.69
0.50
.89
TDDS-Pathogen
4.12
1.14
.84
TDDS-Sexual
3.46
1.45
.84
TDDS-Moral
3.80
1.32
.87
PVD
Germ Aversion
3.90
1.21
.71
Perceived Infectability 3.23
1.37
.84
TOSCA-Shame
2.90
0.64
.80
TOSCA-Guilt
4.00
0.51
.77
GASP-Shame
4.09
0.92
.72
NSE Subscale
5.21
1.21
.69
Withdraw Subscale
2.97
1.03
.61
GASP-Guilt
5.18
0.98
.79
NBE Subscale
4.77
1.30
.74
Repair Subscale
5.59
0.88
.56
PANAS-Negative Affect
1.46
0.55
.84
DS = Disgust Scale, TDDS = Three Domain Disgust Scale, PVD = Perceived Vulnerability to
Disease, TOSCA = Test of Self-Conscious Affect, GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness, NSE =
Negative-Self-Evaluation, NBE = Negative-Behavior-Evaluation, PANAS = Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule

SHAME AND DISGUST
Table 5
Standardized Regression Coefficient and R2 Change for the Shame Analysis in Study 2
R2 Change

.33**
.09
Disgust Sensitivity
Disgust Manipulation
Disgust vs. Neutral
-.01
Disgust vs. Negative
.01
.05
Interaction
Disgust vs. Neutral
-.27**
Disgust vs. Negative
-.23*
*p < .05, **p < .01
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Table 6
Standardized Regression Coefficient and R2 Change for the Shame Analysis in Study 2
R2 Change

.33**
.09
Disgust Sensitivity
Disgust Manipulation
Disgust vs. Neutral
-.01
Disgust vs. Negative
.06
.03
Interaction
Disgust vs. Neutral
-.21*
Disgust vs. Negative
.12
*p < .05, **p < .01
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Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for all Measures in Study 3.
M
SD

DS
2.62
0.53
.91
TDDS-Pathogen
4.06
1.13
.79
TDDS-Sexual
3.12
1.49
.84
TDDS-Moral
3.83
1.20
.82
DPSS-R
Propensity
3.08
0.73
.79
Sensitivity
2.49
0.84
.81
PVD
Germ Aversion
4.00
1.30
.77
Perceived Infectability
3.47
1.51
.90
PI-COWC
2.45
0.85
.86
TOSCA-Shame
2.96
0.57
.72
TOSCA-Guilt
4.08
0.51
.77
GASP-Shame
4.14
0.86
.72
NSE Subscale
5.48
1.12
.69
Withdraw Subscale
2.81
0.94
.59
GASP-Guilt
5.33
0.93
.75
NBE Subscale
5.05
1.17
.67
Repair Subscale
5.60
0.94
.60
PANAS-Negative Affect
1.41
0.50
.78
DS = Disgust Scale, TDDS = Three Domain Disgust Scale, DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and
Sensitivity Scale-Revised, PVD = Perceived Vulnerability to Disease, PI-COWC = Checking
Obsessions and Washing Compulsions subscale of the Padua Inventory, TOSCA = Test of SelfConscious Affect, GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness, NSE = Negative-Self-Evaluation, NBE
= Negative-Behavior-Evaluation, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
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Table 8
Standardized Regression Coefficient and R2 Change for the Purity Manipulation Analysis in
Study 3
R2 Change

.51**
.26
Disgust Sensitivity
Purity Manipulation
Purity vs. Neutral
.10
Purity vs. Positive
.11
.01
Interaction
Purity vs. Neutral
-.03
Purity vs. Positive
-.13
**p < .01
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Table 9
Standardized Regression Coefficient and R2 Change for the Disgust Manipulation Analysis in
Study 3
R2 Change

.47**
.25
Disgust Sensitivity
Disgust Manipulation
Disgust vs. Neutral
.18*
Disgust vs. Negative
.15*
.00
Interaction
Disgust vs. Neutral
.08
Disgust vs. Negative
.05
*p < .05, **p < .01
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Table 10
Means, Standard Deviations, and Cronbach’s Alphas for all Measures in Study 4.
M
SD

DS
2.61
0.49
.88
TDDS-Pathogen
4.10
1.04
.78
TDDS-Sexual
3.22
1.46
.84
TDDS-Moral
3.67
1.39
.89
DPSS-R
Propensity
3.11
0.64
.76
Sensitivity
2.60
0.84
.82
PVD
Germ Aversion
4.04
1.21
.77
Perceived Infectability 3.51
1.44
.91
PI-COWC
2.61
0.94
.89
TOSCA-Shame
3.07
0.54
.73
TOSCA-Guilt
4.08
0.39
.65
GASP-Shame
5.67
0.97
.73
NSE Subscale
5.21
1.21
.65
Withdraw Subscale
2.92
1.12
.70
GASP-Guilt
5.53
0.88
.76
NBE Subscale
5.25
1.09
.66
Repair Subscale
5.81
0.85
.60
PANAS-Negative Affect
1.45
0.58
.85
DS = Disgust Scale, TDDS = Three Domain Disgust Scale, DPSS-R = Disgust Propensity and
Sensitivity Scale-Revised, PVD = Perceived Vulnerability to Disease, PI-COWC = Checking
Obsessions and Washing Compulsions subscale of the Padua Inventory, TOSCA = Test of SelfConscious Affect, GASP = Guilt and Shame Proneness, NSE = Negative-Self-Evaluation, NBE
= Negative-Behavior-Evaluation, PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
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Table 11
Standardized Regression Coefficient and R2 Change for the Shame Analysis in Study 4


Disgust Sensitivity
Disgust Manipulation
Interaction
**p < .01

.49**
.03
-.23**

R2 Change
.24
.03

SHAME AND DISGUST

Figure 1. Condition by Disgust Sensitivty Interaction predicting Shame in Study 2
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Figure 2. Interaction between Condition and Disgust Sensitivity predicting Shame in Study 4.
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Appendix A: Questionnaires
Disgust Scale (Haidt et al., 1994)
Three Domain Disgust Scale (Tybur et al., 2009)
Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised (van Overveld et al., 2006)
Contamination Obsessions and Washing Compulsions Subscale (Burns et al., 1996)
Perceived Vulnerability to Disease Scale (Duncan et al., 2009)
Test of Self-Conscious Affect (Tangney & Dearing, 2002)
Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen et al., in press)
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988)
Demographics
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Disgust (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994)

Responses for items 1 through 16 can range from 1 to 4, 1 being strongly disagree and 4 being
strongly agree. Responses for items 17-32 can range from 1 to 4, 1 being not disgusting at all
and 4 being very disgusting.
1. I might be willing to try eating monkey meat, under some circumstances.
2. I try to avoid letting any part of my body touch the toilet seat in a public restroom, even when it
appears clean.
3. It would bother me to be in a science class, and to see a human hand preserved in a jar.
4. It would make me uncomfortable to hear a couple making love in the next room of a hotel.
5. If I see someone vomit, it makes me sick to my stomach.
6. I have no problem buying and wearing shirts from used clothing stores.
7. It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body.
8. It would bother me to see photos of two people having oral sex.
9. Seeing a cockroach in someone else's house does not bother me.
10. I probably would not go to my favorite restaurant if I found out that the cook had a cold.
11. It would bother me to sleep in a nice hotel room if I knew that a man had died of a heart attack in
that room the night before.
12. It is OK with me if people want to look at pornography involving animals.
13. Even if I was hungry, I would not drink a bowl of my favorite soup if it had been stirred by a
used but thoroughly washed fly-swatter.
14. I would not hold a dollar bill between my lips (like if I needed a free hand), because so many
strangers have touched it with their dirty hands.
15. If I were properly trained, I would be willing to help draw blood in a blood drive.
16. I think that people who masturbate every day are degrading themselves.
17. You see maggots on a piece of meat in an outdoor garbage pail.
18. You take a sip of soda and then realize that you picked up the wrong can, which a stranger had
been drinking out of.
19. You see someone accidentally stick a fishing hook through his finger.
20. You hear about a 30 year old man who seeks sexual relationships with 80 year old women.
21. While you are walking through a tunnel under a railroad track, you smell urine.
22. You sit down on a public bus, and feel that the seat is still warm from the last person who sat
there.
23. You see a man with his intestines exposed after an accident.
24. As part of a sex education class, you are required to inflate a new unlubricated condom, using
your mouth.
25. A friend offers you a piece of chocolate shaped like dog-doo.
26. You find out that someone you despise used to live in your house, and sleep in your bedroom.
27. Your friend's pet cat dies, and you have to pick up the dead body with your bare hands.
28. You hear about an adult brother and sister who like to have sex with each other.
29. You see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public toilet.
30. While traveling for 2 weeks with a friend, you discover that your underwear got mixed up in the
wash, and you are wearing your friend’s underwear.
31. You accidentally touch the ashes of a person who has been cremated.
32. While walking through a park, you see two dogs mating (having sex)
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Three Domain Disgust Scale (Tybur et al., 2009)

The following items describe a variety of concepts. Please rate how disgusting you find the
concepts described in the items, where 0 means that you do not find the concept disgusting at all,
and 6 means that you find the concept extremely disgusting.

1. Shoplifting a candy bar from a convenience store
2. Hearing two strangers having sex
3. Stepping on dog poop
4. Stealing from a neighbor
5. Performing oral sex
6. Sitting next to someone who has red sores on their arm
7. A student cheating to get good grades
8. Watching a pornographic video
9. Shaking hands with a stranger who has sweaty palms
10. Deceiving a friend
11. Finding out that someone you don’t like has sexual fantasies about you
12. Seeing some mold on old leftovers in your refrigerator
13. Forging someone’s signature on a legal document
14. Bringing someone you just met back to your room to have sex
15. Standing close to a person who has body odor
16. Cutting to the front of a line to purchase the last few tickets to a show
17. A stranger of the opposite sex intentionally rubbing your thigh in an elevator
18. Seeing a cockroach run across the floor
19. Intentionally lying during a business transaction
20. Having anal sex with someone of the opposite sex
21. Accidentally touching a person’s bloody cut

APPENDIX A
Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale-Revised (van Overveld et al., 2006)
Respond to the following items on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being never and 5 being always.
1. I screw up my face in disgust.
2. Disgusting things make my stomach turn.
3. I experience disgust.
4. I find something disgusting.
5. I feel repulsed.
6. When I experience disgust, it is an intense feeling.
7. I become disgusted more easily than other people.
8. I avoid disgusting things.
9. It scares me when I feel faint.
10. It scares me when I feel nauseous.
11. When I feel disgusted, I worry that I might pass out.
12. I think feeling disgust is bad for me.
13. I think disgusting items could cause me illness/infection
14. I worry that I might swallow a disgusting thing.
15. It embarrasses me when I feel disgusted.
16. When I notice that I feel nauseous, I worry about vomiting.
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Contamination Obsessions and Washing Compulsions Subscale (Burns et al., 1996)
Respond to the following items on a scale of 0 to 4, 0 being Not at All and 4 being Very Much.
1. I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money.
2. I think even slight contact with bodily secretions (sweat, saliva, etc.) may contaminate my
clothes or somehow harm me.
3. I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been touched by strangers or by
certain people.
4. I find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things.
5. I avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease and contamination.
6. I avoid using public telephones because I am afraid of contagion and disease.
7. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary.
8. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I think I may be dirty or
‘contaminated’.
9. If I touch something I think is ‘contaminated’, I immediately have to wash or clean myself.
10. If an animal touches me, I feel dirty and immediately have to wash myself or change my
clothing.
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Perceived Vulnerability to Disease (Duncan et al., 2009)

Respond to the following items on a scale of 1 to 7, 1 being strongly disagree and 7 being
strongly agree.
1. In general, I am very susceptible to colds, flu and other infectious diseases.
2. I am unlikely to catch a cold, flu or other illness, even if it is ‘going around’. (reverse-scored)
3. If an illness is ‘going around’, I will get it.
4. My immune system protects me from most illnesses that other people get. (reverse-scored)
5. I am more likely than the people around me to catch an infectious disease.
6. My past experiences make me believe I am not likely to get sick even when my friends are
sick. (reverse-scored)
7. I have a history of susceptibility to infectious disease.
8. I prefer to wash my hands pretty soon after shaking someone’s hand.
9. I avoid using public telephones because of the risk that I may catch something from the
previous user.
10. I do not like to write with a pencil someone else has obviously chewed on.
11. I dislike wearing used clothes because you do not know what the last person who wore it
was like.
12. I am comfortable sharing a water bottle with a friend. (reverse-scored)
13. It really bothers me when people sneeze without covering their mouths.
14. It does not make me anxious to be around sick people. (reverse-scored)
15. My hands do not feel dirty after touching money. (reverse-scored)
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Test of Self-Conscious Affect (Tangney & Dearing, 2002)

Imagine the following scenarios and respond to the items on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being not
likely and 5 being very likely.
1. You make plans to meet a friend for lunch. At 5 o’clock, you realize you stood your
friend up.
a. You would think: “I’m inconsiderate.”
b. You’d think you should make it up to your friend as soon as possible.
2. You break something at work and then hide it.
a. You would think: “This is making me anxious. I need to either fix it or get
someone else to.”
b. You would think about quitting.
3. You are out with friends one evening, and you’re feeling especially witty and attractive.
Your best friend’s spouse seems to particularly enjoy your company.
a. You would think: “I should have been aware of what my best friend was feeling.”
b. You would probably avoid eye contact for a long time.
4. At work, you wait until the last minute to plan a project, and it turns out badly.
a. You would feel incompetent.
b. You would feel: “I deserve to be reprimanded for mismanaging the project.”
5. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error.
a. You would keep quiet and avoid the coworker.
b. You would feel unhappy and eager to correct the situation.
6. For several days you put off making a difficult phone call. At the last minute you make
the call and are able to manipulate the conversation so that all goes well.
a. You would regret that you put it off.
b. You would feel like a coward.
7. While playing around you throw a ball and it hits your friend in the face.
a. You would feel inadequate that you can’t even throw a ball.
b. You would apologize and make sure your friend feels better.
8. You have recently moved away from your family, and everyone has been very helpful.
A few times you needed to borrow money, but you paid it back as soon as you could.
a. You feel immature.
b. You would return the favor as quickly as you could.
9. You are driving down the road, and you hit a small animal.
a. You would think: “I’m terrible.”
b. You’d feel bad you hadn’t been more alert driving down the road.
10. You walk out of an exam thinking you did extremely well. Then you find out you did
poorly.
a. You would think: “I should have studied harder.”
b. You would feel stupid.
11. You and a group of coworkers worked very hard on a project. Your boss singles you out
for a bonus because the project was such a success.
a. You would feel alone and apart from your colleagues.
b. You would feel you should not accept it.
12. While out with a group of friends, you make fun of a friend who’s not there.
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a. You would feel small…like a rat.
b. You would apologize and talk about that person’s good points.
13. You make a big mistake on an important project at work. People were depending on
you, and your boss criticizes you.
a. You would feel like you wanted to hide.
b. You would think: “I should have recognized the problem and done a better job.”
14. You volunteer to help with the local Special Olympics for handicapped children. It turns
out to be frustrating and time-consuming work. You think seriously about quitting, but
then you see how happy the kids are.
a. You would feel selfish, and you’d think you are basically lazy.
b. You would think: “I should be more concerned about people who are less
fortunate.”
15. You are taking care of your friend’s dog while your friend is on vacation, and the dog
runs away.
a. You would think, “ I am irresponsible.”
b. You would vow to be more careful next time.
16. You attend your coworker’s housewarming party and you spill red wine on a new creamcolored carpet, but you think no one notices.
a. You would stay late to help clean up the stain after the party.
b. You would wish you were anywhere but at the party.
(shame items 1a, 2b, 3b, 4a, 5a, 6b, 7a, 8a, 9a, 10b, 11a, 12a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 16b)
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Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (Cohen, et al., in press)
Guilt and Shame Proneness (GASP) Scale
Instructions: In this questionnaire you will read about situations that people are likely to
encounter in day-to-day life, followed by common reactions to those situations. As you read each
scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate the likelihood that you would
react in the way described.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Very Unlikely Unlikely Slightly Unlikely About 50% Likely Slightly Likely Likely Very Likely
1. After realizing you have received too much change at a store, you decide to keep it because
the salesclerk doesn't notice. What is the likelihood that you would feel uncomfortable about
keeping the money?
2. You are privately informed that you are the only one in your group that did not make the
honor society because you skipped too many days of school. What is the likelihood that this
would lead you to become more responsible about attending school?
3. You rip an article out of a journal in the library and take it with you. Your teacher discovers
what you did and tells the librarian and your entire class. What is the likelihood that this would
make you would feel like a bad person?
4. After making a big mistake on an important project at work in which people were depending
on you, your boss criticizes you in front of your coworkers. What is the likelihood that you
would feign sickness and leave work?
5. You reveal a friend’s secret, though your friend never finds out. What is the likelihood that
your failure to keep the secret would lead you to exert extra effort to keep secrets in the future?
6. You give a bad presentation at work. Afterwards your boss tells your coworkers it was your
fault that your company lost the contract. What is the likelihood that you would feel
incompetent?
7. A friend tells you that you boast a great deal. What is the likelihood that you would stop
spending time with that friend?
8. Your home is very messy and unexpected guests knock on your door and invite themselves in.
What is the likelihood that you would avoid the guests until they leave?
9. You secretly commit a felony. What is the likelihood that you would feel remorse about
breaking the law?
10. You successfully exaggerate your damages in a lawsuit. Months later, your lies are
discovered and you are charged with perjury. What is the likelihood that you would think you are
a despicable human being?
11. You strongly defend a point of view in a discussion, and though nobody was aware of it, you
realize that you were wrong. What is the likelihood that this would make you think more
carefully before you speak?
12. You take office supplies home for personal use and are caught by your boss. What is the
likelihood that this would lead you to quit your job?
13. Because of your carelessness, you break something you borrowed from a friend, though your
friend never notices. What is the likelihood that you would replace what you broke?
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14. You make a mistake at work and find out a coworker is blamed for the error. Later, your
coworker confronts you about your mistake. What is the likelihood that you would feel like a
coward?
15. You make a strong argument in a debate but the moderator points out to everyone that your
facts are incorrect. What is the likelihood that you would feel like an idiot?
16. You falsify some information in a job application though it is never discovered. What is the
likelihood that you would feel that the way you acted was despicable?
17. While you are out with friends, someone you knowingly deceived tells your friends that you
are a liar. What is the likelihood that you would quickly leave and go home?
18. At a coworker’s housewarming party, you spill red wine on their new cream-colored carpet.
You cover the stain with a chair so that nobody notices your mess. What is the likelihood that
you would feel that the way you acted was pathetic?
19. While discussing a heated subject with friends, you suddenly realize you are shouting though
nobody seems to notice. What is the likelihood that you would try to act more considerately
toward your friends?
20. You lie to people but they never find out about it. What is the likelihood that you would feel
terrible about the lies you told?
GASP SCORING
Guilt-Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE): 1, 9, 16, 18, 20
Guilt-Repair: 2, 5, 11, 13, 19
Shame-Negative-Self-Evaluation (NSE): 3, 6, 10, 14, 15
Shame-Withdraw: 4, 7, 8, 12, 17
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Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al., 1988)

This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate the extent to
which you feel this way right now, at the present moment. Use the following scale to record your
answers.
1
2
very slightly a little
or not at all

_____ interested
_____ distressed
_____ excited
_____ upset
_____ strong
_____ guilty
_____ scared
_____ hostile
_____ enthusiastic
_____ proud
_____ irritable
_____ alert
_____ ashamed
_____ inspired
_____ nervous
_____ determined
_____ attentive
_____ jittery
_____ active
_____ afraid

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

5
extremely
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Demographic Information

Age:

____

Ethnicity: (Check all that apply)
___African
___African-American
___Arab/Arab-American
___Asian/Asian-American
___Caribbean

___Hispanic/Hispanic-American
___Native-American
___Pacific Islander
___White/Caucasian
___Other __________________________.

Gender: (circle one) 1) Male

2) Female

Please indicate your age: _____
What political party best represents your beliefs?
___Democrat

___ Republican ___Libertarian ___Independent ___Other

What is your religious affiliation (check one):
___ Christian – Protestant
___ Muslim
___ Christian – Catholic
___ Jewish
___ Hindu
___ Atheist
___ Buddhist
___ Agnostic
___ Not religious
___ Other – Please list:

How would you characterize your hometown? (check one)
_____ rural (unincorporated)
_____ small town (village or town)
_____ suburban (metropolitan area of a large city)
_____ small city (population < 30,000)
_____ medium-sized city (population 30,000 – 100,000)
_____ large city (population > 100,000)
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Appendix B: Primes

Disgust
Pus
Fart
Scab
Snot
Puke
Poop
Urine
Vomit
Mucus
Diarrhea

Negative
Pity
Fault
Scar
Snob
Pinch
Penalty
Useless
Vandal
Maniac
Disappointing

Neutral
Plain
Farm
Square
Street
Plant
Paper
Unit
Vest
Month
Door

Positive
Joy
Calm
Smile
Laugh
Happy
Friendly
Pleasant
Bliss
Amazed
Cheer

Purity
New
Clean
Shower
Soap
Bathe
Fresh
New
Rinse
Cleansed
Washed
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